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STANDING ON HOLY GROUND: HOW 
RETHINKING JUSTICIABILITY MIGHT BRING 
PEACE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 




The Establishment Clause is home to both procedural and substantive disorder.  
Particularly when evaluating religious speech by the government, the Supreme Court 
has applied a number of distinct tests, with varying degrees of strictness.  There has 
never been an overarching principle for determining which test would appear at 
which time; commentators, and occasionally the Justices themselves, have suspected 
that desired results drove the choice of tests.  At the same time, the Court has 
articulated a series of requirements necessary for a plaintiff to have standing to 
challenge government action, only to ignore them in government religious speech 
cases.  The resulting lack of clarity leaves lower courts to their own devices in 
endeavoring to calm increasingly intense struggles.  This article sets out a theory that 
altering one of these problems might correct the other.  Analogizing to the Treaty of 
Westphalia’s temporal limit on the airing of grievances, the Supreme Court could 
replace the current standing chaos with a limit to claims against current government 
activity.  Such a rule would foreclose the ability of pro-religion forces to new 
domination of the public square, but would also prevent anti-religion forces from 
removing the vestiges of past government activity that are central to the American 
experience.  Current doctrine ends with many of the same results, but doing so under 
the standing doctrine would remove the camouflage of alternative substantive tests.  
Simultaneously, it would decrease the incentive of participants in the national 
political struggle over religion to ever more hostile moves.  The clarity this doctrinal 
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I.  “THAT FOR MANY YEARS PAST, DISCORDS AND CIVIL DIVISIONS BEING STIR’D 
UP”:1 THE MESS THAT IS THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Establishment Clause2 is a mess.  It sometimes seems like everyone says so.3  
This is true in widely divergent areas in which the government and religion touch, 
                                                           
 1 Treaty of Westphalia (Oct. 24, 1648), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_ 
century/westphal.asp [hereinafter Westphalia]. 
 2 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 3 Not literally everyone, of course.  But Supreme Court Justices and academics alike have 
gotten in on the act.  See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“our Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in 
hopeless disarray”).  See also Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need 
for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 24 (2010) (“the Court’s modern decisions 
interpreting those [religion] clauses have shed more heat than light on the discussion and have 
provoked ongoing controversy instead of any settled resolution of the issues”). 
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from public funding for religious schools4 to government resolution of internal 
religious property and employment disputes.5  When the government is itself 
speaking or acting in an arguably religious way, the chaos of the Establishment 
Clause doctrine is nothing short of remarkable. 
It is possible that this doctrinal uncertainty is not all that bad.  Much government 
religious activity could plausibly be characterized as de minimis, so any alleged 
constitutional injury is the equivalent of a flesh wound.  Yet constitutional 
limitations on government religious speech and conduct—real or imagined—seem to 
be among the most contentious issues in our modern republic.  This is potentially 
grave: widespread public hostility to what is believed to be bad constitutional 
practice can only undermine confidence in the Constitution, the government, or both. 
In this paper I will suggest that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is rare in that 
it contains both procedural and substantive disorder.  I will argue that the conflicting 
substantive “tests” for the Establishment Clause reflect a desire by courts, especially 
the Supreme Court, to reach solutions in difficult cases that seem instinctively 
correct.6  In short, the Court will use the test that will allow them to reach the result 
that appears—somehow—to be the most appropriate for a particular matter in front 
of them.  The article will then consider ways in which the procedural rules of the 
Establishment Clause, particularly the requirement of standing, represent such 
internal contradiction that they beg for reform.7  Such reform is urgent if the Court is 
not to resolve the chaos of its own Establishment Clause jurisprudence by simply 
withdrawing from the field of battle, leaving it to political forces to determine the 
meaning of the Constitution in this area.8 
The article offers a different way out.  If it is correct that current Establishment 
Clause standing doctrine is hopelessly unmoored from any workable standards, it is 
possible that a procedural repair could offer some clarity to the substantive issues.  I 
will suggest that this new standard be one derived from the Treaty of Westphalia, the 
1648 agreement that ended the Thirty Years’ War.  That treaty endeavored to 
achieve a spatial peace by imposing a temporal one; it articulated careful rules for 
religion and religious tolerance, but those rules were all designed to be forward-
                                                           
 4 The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this particular area, Arizona Christian Sch. 
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011), resisted the temptation to provide clarity in the 
area by resolving the question as a matter of standing. 
 5 Although this area is comparatively slightly more consistent, there are still significant 
disputes.  Compare Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (courts 
may not interfere with decisions by hierarchical churches in ecclesiastical matters), with Jones 
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1980) (permitting courts to decide intra-church disputes upon the 
basis of “neutral principles of law,” and reading Milivojevich only as prohibiting courts not 
from intervening, but from deciding cases on the basis of religious doctrine or practice). 
 6 See infra Part II. 
 7 See infra Part III.  
 8 At least one Justice believes that has in fact happened.  “[I]n the context of public 
acknowledgments of God there are legitimate competing interests: On the one hand, the 
interest of that minority in not feeling “excluded”; but on the other, the interest of the 
overwhelming majority of religious believers in being able to give God thanks and 
supplication as a people, and with respect to our national endeavors. Our national tradition has 
resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.”  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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looking.  The treaty drew a curtain over past activities, recognizing that settling 
future conflicts would be immeasurably more difficult if each argument tomorrow 
could include the refighting of matters settled yesterday.  Justice Breyer has hinted at 
such a path to religious peace.9  Unfortunately, because he sought a substantive path, 
his solution attracted no support among his colleagues.  I will suggest that Justice 
Breyer’s goal for the Establishment Clause—increasing tolerance and seeking 
religious peace—can be sought more effectively by redesigning the standing 
doctrine.  
If the Supreme Court adopts a rule of standing that imposes a temporal peace, 
courts would continue to allow challenges to current forms of government religious 
speech.  Complaints against speech of the past, such as long-standing monuments, 
could not proceed.  This standing rule would be the equivalent of applying a 
restrictive rule for current government speech, but a much more permissive one for 
historical events.  As the Court has done essentially this in recent years, there would 
be little change in the outcome of the few cases that make their way to the highest 
court.  But the Court would no longer camouflage such decisions by using alternate 
substantive tests without clear reasons.  This would leave lower courts and 
governmental bodies throughout the nation with a much clearer path before them.  
Real peace requires clarity, and clarity is possible through a change in the standing 
rules. 
II.  “THE DISORDERS OF A LONG AND CRUEL WAR”:10 THE SUBSTANTIVE CHAOS OF 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Since the Supreme Court first entered into the fray regarding the Establishment 
Clause, it has relied heavily on the proposition that the Constitution requires the 
government to remain neutral in the area of religion.11  I have elsewhere argued that 
neutrality is impossible, at least in the area of government speech.12  Whether that is 
correct or not, it is demonstrably the case that the quest for neutrality has led to the 
adoption of a variety of tests that are inconsistent at best and contradictory at worst. 
This is especially true when the conduct being measured against the 
Establishment Clause is the government’s own speech.  Whether it is the display of 
religious iconography,13 references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance,14 or the 
hiring of chaplains to offer daily prayers,15 the Supreme Court has moved from test 
                                                           
 9 See infra Part V.A. 
 10 Westphalia, supra note 1. 
 11 This principle is often derived from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court that the 
core meaning of the Establishment Clause is that “[n]either a state nor the Federal 
Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another.”  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 
(1947). 
 12 John M. Bickers, Of Non-Horses, Quantum Mechanics, and the Establishment Clause, 
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 371 (2009). 
 13 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573 (1989). 
 14 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 15 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
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to test with inadequate explanations and inconsistent holdings.  The entire area 
leaves lower court judges adrift,16 unsure how to approach these problems,17 and 
often left to their own devices in ways that even they find unappealing.18 
A.  The Flawed Establishment Clause “Tests” 
Establishment Clause doctrines are constitutional orphans, unloved by even those 
who use them.  Ever since Chief Justice Burger endeavored to impose a logical order 
on the smattering of diverse rulings that preceded him, justices19 and scholars20 alike 
have expressed displeasure over not only his proposed solution, but also every one 
offered in response to it.  There may be some profit in quickly surveying Chief 
Justice Burger’s test, announced in the oft-mentioned (and oft-vilified) Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,21 before proceeding to the other schemes for evaluating Establishment 
Clause cases that have been advanced to supplant or augment it.  Each offers an 
array of failures of its own. 
1.  Lemon 
When plaintiffs challenged the augmentation of salaries of teachers in private 
schools in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island (and also textbook support in 
Pennsylvania),22 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to try to bring order from 
the disorderly stare decisis that existed.23  In a variety of decisions notable for their 
sweeping prose, the Court had held that the Establishment Clause allowed public 
school districts to pay the public transportation costs of students attending private 
(including religious) schools,24 to loan secular textbooks to such schools without 
charge,25 or to release public school students during the school day for instruction at 
                                                           
 16 Or even in Limbo.  See Green v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1285 
(E.D. Okla. 2006) (“the state of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is hardly Paradise.  
Indeed, it may be more akin to Limbo.  Dante envisioned Limbo as a place of sorrow without 
torment, illuminated by the light of reason and home to virtuous pagans unfit to enter the 
kingdom of heaven.  Yes, we are definitely in Limbo.”). 
 17 See, e.g., Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(DeMoss, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court cannot continue to speak out of both sides of 
its mouth if it intends to provide real guidance to federal courts on this issue.”). 
 18 See, e.g., ACLU v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624 (6th Cir. 2005) (“we remain in 
Establishment Clause purgatory.”). 
 19 See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“the utter inconsistency of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence”). 
 20 See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: 
Establishment Neutrality and the ‘No Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 269 (1987) 
(“Although the Lemon test has survived for over a decade and a half, few have found the 
formulation satisfactory.”).  
 21 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 22 Id. at 607. 
 23 Id. at 612 (“Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative 
criteria developed by the Court over many years.”). 
 24 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 25 Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
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religious centers.26  Cities might also grant tax exemptions for real property used 
solely for religious purposes.27  On the other hand, the Court had held that the 
Establishment Clause prohibited religious instruction by members of the clergy in 
public schools.28  The Constitution also forbade beginning each public school day 
with an official prayer29 or with a reading of Bible verses,30 and States could not 
outlaw the teaching of evolution.31  The opinions offered an array of reasons why, 
but they lacked reference to each other in a way that would allow lower court judges 
to give confident answers to hard questions. 
Just as the Burger Court was to attempt to do for obscenity32 and abortion,33 the 
Court sought to combine prior case law and its own constitutional philosophy into a 
clear, intelligible, and consistent doctrine.  The opinion in Lemon viewed the 
precedents as offering three principles to courts in evaluating government 
compliance with the Establishment Clause.  In its famous formulation, “the statute 
must have a secular legislative purpose . . . its principle or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [and it] must not foster ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”34 
Purpose and principle effect certainly made a logical pairing in the abstract; act 
and intent are routinely linked in the law.35  Even from the initial announcement in 
1971, the requirement that the behavior not excessively entangle government and 
religion seemed a little disconnected from the other two.  The Court believed that it 
was required by precedent, though,36  and it turned out to be the pivotal feature of the 
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island programs on which the Court was ruling.37 
The opinion seems to carry a tone of confidence, a sense that the test would be a 
useful one.  That confidence has proven to be ill-placed.38  Nonetheless, it was a 
                                                           
 26 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
 27 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 28 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
 29 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 30 Abington Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 31 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 32 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 33 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 34 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 35 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 36 The quotation marks in that portion of the Lemon test are because that language is 
drawn verbatim from the Court’s approval, the previous year, of New York’s property tax 
exemption for places of religious worship. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S 664, 674 (1970). 
 37 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620-21 (“the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure 
that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role give rise to entanglements between church 
and state.”). 
 38 See discussion infra Parts II.A.2-II.A.5. 
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valiant effort to clarify a confusing doctrine.39  Lemon bravely announced that there 
would be a new coherence to the world of church-state relations. 
2.  History 
A decade later, though, that world had apparently changed, albeit with no 
fanfare.  In 1983, the Supreme Court confronted the Nebraska legislature’s practice 
of using public money to hire a chaplain to open each day with a brief devotional 
prayer.40  Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion in the case, concluding that the 
program did not violate the Establishment Clause because the practice of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer was “deeply embedded in the history and tradition of 
this country.”41  Although the majority almost laconically noted that the Eighth 
Circuit had found that the Nebraska practice violated all three parts of the Lemon 
test,42 the opinion overturning that ruling made no use of that test at all.43  To make 
matters worse, the majority opinion came from the pen of Chief Justice Burger, the 
author of the Lemon test. 
The absence of Lemon in the Marsh recipe served an obvious purpose according 
to the skeptics of the majority opinion.  The Lemon test, taken seriously, would have 
required the Court to prohibit the chaplaincy program.  It borders on the incredible to 
ascertain a secular purpose for the hiring of chaplain whose only duty is to offer a 
prayer to and for lawmakers.44  And while the primary effect of this small gesture 
may not have benefitted religion by successfully converting anyone, the dissent 
pointed out that the prayers “explicitly link religious beliefs and observance to the 
power and prestige of the State.”45  This linkage was heightened by the fact that a 
single preacher, from a single denomination of Christianity, had been the chaplain 
for sixteen years.46  Finally, there was arguably an entanglement problem as well.  
As the dissent noted, the very decision to hire a particular chaplain from a particular 
faith involved the government in deciding which faiths were “suitable.”47 
                                                           
 39 It survives, commemorated not only by Justice Scalia’s famed characterization of it as a 
“ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, 
after being repeatedly killed and buried,” but in the fact that more than 1,700 cases have had 
to confront and construe it.  Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, A., concurring). 
 40 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 41 Id. at 786. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Indeed, Walz, which had been so heavily relied on in formulating the Lemon test, see 
supra note 36, was now characterized as notable for the way in which it “considered the 
weight to be accorded to history.”  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.  
 44 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That the ‘purpose’ of legislative 
prayer is preeminently religious rather than secular seems to me to be self-evident.  ‘To 
invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws,’ is nothing but a 
religious act”). 
 45 Id. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 46 Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 47 Id. at 799 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens also noted that the majoritarian faith 
for any given region would dominate such a selection process.   
 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
422 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:415 
Pinned between the reasoning of an appellate court it was overturning and the 
attacks of the dissenters, the Court never sought to explain why those views of 
Lemon were wrong.48  Neither did it repudiate the Lemon test.  After noting the 
Eighth Circuit result, Chief Justice Burger simply ignored his own test of twelve 
years earlier.  That decision may have been a particularly painful blow to Lemon 
because of its source, but it was certainly not to be the last event in what would 
become the perpetual abuse of Lemon. 
3.  Endorsement 
When Justice Sandra Day O’Connor arrived on the Court, she brought with her 
an idea about the Establishment Clause that was distinct from Lemon.  In her view, 
the real problem that the Establishment Clause was meant to prevent was the threat 
that religion would be made relevant in politics, creating increased difficulties in 
both areas.  Her desire to preserve a religious peace led her to outline a new test, one 
that has garnered both admiration and hostility.49 
The “endorsement test” she championed sought to prevent the government from 
“making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the 
political community.”50  Justice O’Connor’s goal was to prevent the government 
from sending “a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders . . . and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.”51  There is an undeniable appeal to this formulation: it calls 
out to the best angels of everyone’s natures, and hearkens back to the oldest 
constitutional protection of religious liberty, the guarantee of Article VI that “no 
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust 
under the United States.”52 
Although the Court never explicitly adopted the endorsement test as a substitute 
for Lemon,53 it sometimes relied heavily on endorsement.  Among the cases in which 
                                                           
Prayers may be said by a Catholic priest in the Massachusetts Legislature and by a 
Presbyterian minister in the Nebraska Legislature, but I would not expect to find a 
Jehovah’s Witness or a disciple of Mary Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as 
the official chaplain in any state legislature. 
Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 48 The majority opinion in Marsh never directly engages the Lemon-based criticisms of the 
dissents. 
 49 See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under 
the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, 64 N.C. L. 
REV. 1049 (1986).  But cf. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 115, 192 (1992) (the endorsement test “exacerbates religious division and discord 
by heightening the sense of grievance over symbolic injuries.”). 
 50 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 51 Id. at 688. 
 52 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 53 Indeed, Justice O’Connor herself seemed to view the test as replacing only the first two 
elements of Lemon, retaining the “excessive entanglement” prohibition as necessary to 
preventing the standing of members of the political community from being affected by their 
religion.  See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88. 
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it appears prominently are one prohibiting the addition of the words “or voluntary 
prayer” to an existing state statute authorizing a moment of silence in public schools 
“for meditation”54 and another removing a crèche from a courthouse stairway.55  The 
test’s apogee may have come in 2000, in a case in which the Court struck down a 
high school football pre-game prayer that was to be delivered by the winner of an 
election.56  The Court used a variety of tests to find the practice unconstitutional, but 
it relied heavily on the idea that the Constitution prohibited the school from sending 
“the ancillary message to members of the audience who are nonadherents ‘that they 
are outsiders, not full members of the political community.’”57  That the Court used 
other tests—generally including Lemon—is certainly true.  It is noteworthy, though, 
that the endorsement test had become a part of the way to understand the 
Establishment Clause.  Its repeated appearance suggests that the justices had begun 
to see it as a helpful guide to the Establishment Clause, especially in government 
speech cases, even though it was not destined to take a position as the “Grand 
Unified Theory” of the Establishment Clause.58 
Quite probably there were few who thought that the Endorsement Test would 
become such a theory, effortlessly solving all establishment clause problems laid 
before it.  Even in the more limited role it attained, however, it aroused objections.  
In a harsh critique of the test, Justice Kennedy outlined a series of noteworthy 
governmental religious activities: Presidential proclamations of Thanksgiving, 
legislative prayers (and even a National Day of Prayer), and the inclusion of “under 
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.59  He argued that these practices could not 
“withstand scrutiny under a faithful application of this [endorsement test] formula.”60 
Perhaps defensively, Justice O’Connor responded that there were certain public 
acts that constituted only “longstanding government acknowledgements of religion” 
and not improper endorsement.61  Labeling these acts “ceremonial deism,” she 
                                                           
 54 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (“In applying the purpose test, it is 
appropriate to ask ‘whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of 
religion.’”) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690). 
 55 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (“In recent years, we have paid 
particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the 
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has long had a place in our 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 56 Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 57 Id. at 309 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688). 
 58 The endorsement test’s creator herself introduced this idea into the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It is always appealing to 
look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases under a 
particular Clause . . . But the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in 
different contexts.”). 
 59 Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 671-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 60 Id. at 670. 
 61 Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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insisted that they “serve the secular purposes of ‘solemnizing public occasions,’ and 
‘expressing confidence in the future.’”62 
This is an odd and seemingly ad-hoc exception.  It does not seem unreasonable to 
think that avowed atheists, and possibly polytheists, receive the message that they 
are outsiders when subjected to the sound of raised patriotic voices proclaiming their 
commitment to being “one Nation under God.”63  Such a message might also 
reasonably be received when these nonadherents function in a nation which makes 
both Thanksgiving64 and Christmas65 national holidays, and in which the official 
motto declares the nation’s trust in the one God of the Pledge.66 
Justice Kennedy’s question—why must objectors and dissenters be free from 
religion that alters their standing in the public square, unless the religion in question 
is “ceremonial deism”—has never been effectively answered.  It cuts religious 
identity very thinly to suggest that nonadherents are excluded by the appearance of a 
crèche, but not by the legislative celebration of Christmas, or that “in God we trust” 
proclaimed on the coins makes no one feel like an outsider, but that similar words 
said before a Friday night football game do. 
The ceremonial deism exception, ultimately, seems very much a functionalist 
device.  Difficult to justify theoretically, it appears to rescue the endorsement test 
just when application of the test would yield discomfiting results.  The existence of 
such an exception, like the non-use of Lemon in hard cases, demonstrates that it is 
not a test that even its proponents wish to rely on solely.67 
4.  Coercion 
Yet another test offered to combat the perceived failings of Lemon was one 
designed to protect all believers from coerced participation in religious activities.68  
Although it might be said that this was properly the focus of either the Free Speech 
Clause or the Free Exercise Clause rather than the Establishment Clause,69 the 
justices who sponsored this view of the Establishment Clause spoke of the Framer’s 
desire to use the clause to protect something that was historically often called the 
                                                           
 62 Id. 
 63 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2002); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 
(2004) (the argument that this language constituted religious indoctrination was raised by 
Michael Newdow in his suit against the public school his daughter attended). 
 64 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (1998). 
 65 Id. 
 66 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2002). 
 67 But, cf., Joseph Blocher, Schrödinger’s Cross: The Quantum Mechanics of the 
Establishment Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 51 (2010) (arguing that the endorsement test is valuable 
because it removes from judges the responsibility of determining the underlying social 
meaning of government religious speech). 
 68 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“It is beyond dispute that, at a 
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or 
participate in religion or its exercise . . .”). 
 69 Intriguingly, Justice Kennedy has argued that the Free Exercise clause “has close 
parallels in the speech provisions,” but that the Establishment Clause “has no precise 
counterpart in the speech provisions.”  Id. at 591.  
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“liberty of conscience.”70  To require someone to attend worship service was 
obviously unacceptable, as was taxing him or her to support a religious activity.71  
On the other hand, if a public university provided funding for publication by a 
religious student group, observers would not conclude that the university was doing 
the talking, and thus there could be “no real likelihood that the speech . . . [was] 
being either endorsed or coerced by the State.”72  Unhappy observers were always 
able simply to look away.  This approach was typically paired with a requirement of 
nondiscrimination: if the government allowed a religious group to use a government 
program or facility, that program or facility had to be available to other, similarly 
situated religious groups.73 
The reliance on “coercion,” even where accompanied by a role for “non-
discrimination,” was ultimately to prove no more successful at unifying 
Establishment Clause thought than the Lemon test or the endorsement test had been.  
This was displayed decisively during what should perhaps have been coercion’s 
triumphant moment.  For in relying on coercion to strike down the practice of 
inviting a religious speaker to give a non-sectarian prayer at an eighth grade 
graduation ceremony,74 the Court aroused the wrath of a previous proponent of that 
very rubric.  In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that coercion, within the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause, was that which was accomplished “by force of law and threat 
of penalty.”75  Psychological or peer-pressure coercion was simply not sufficient, in 
Justice Scalia’s view, to constitute coercion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.76 
                                                           
 70 See, e.g., The Commission of New Hampshire of 1680, quoted in Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, n.6 (1947). 
 71 Like so many other principles of modern Establishment Clause law, these ideas were 
given early voice in Justice Black’s list of “thou shalt nots” issued to the government in the 
seminal Everson v. Bd. of Educ..  See id. at 15-16 (“Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government . . . can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church . . . 
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion . . . No tax in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support any religious activities . . .”). 
 72 Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995). 
 73 Perhaps the easiest “least common denominator” to find agreement among Supreme 
Court Justices of diverse ideology is the principle of non-discrimination, from those who seek 
a powerful Establishment Clause to those who seek an Establishment Clause more 
accommodating toward expression of religion in the public square.  Compare Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 281 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[q]uite 
obviously, however, the University could not allow a group of Republicans or Presbyterians to 
meet while denying Democrats or Mormons the same privilege.”) with Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[t]he Clause was also designed to stop the 
Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over 
others.”).  All Justices seem agreed in principle that the government may not allocate benefits 
on the basis of faith.  See infra Part II.A.5 (for a disturbingly discordant note in this symphony 
in the discussion of the “monotheism exception”). 
 74 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 75 Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 76 See id. at 642 (arguing that the Court’s error was in seeking a definition of coercion by 
reading Freud rather than the “disciples of Blackstone”). 
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This divide has brought much attention to the intricacies and failings of the 
coercion test.77  For the purposes of this paper, it hardly matters which version of the 
test one uses.  For whether one is concerned only with official punishment, or takes 
into account the group psychology accompanying the government action, it is 
difficult to believe that a serious argument exists that coercion should be the only test 
in areas of government speech challenged under the Establishment Clause. 
A simple thought experiment demonstrates this.  Imagine that a group of donors, 
troubled by what they perceive as the decline of religion in American society, raises 
money for a seventy-five foot tall cross.  The cross will bear the following 
inscription, in letters three feet high, on its base: “Dedicated in honor of Jesus Christ, 
recognizing the American people’s united commitment to the teachings of the Prince 
of Ethics.”78  The group wishes to install the cross on the National Mall, and enlists 
the help and support of a handful of key members of Congress.  Those members add 
an amendment granting the group’s wishes to an omnibus budget bill.  Other 
members may oppose this, but most do not wish to incur the electoral wrath that they 
fear will accompany a motion to remove the cross from the bill.  The bill passes, and 
the cross is duly assembled. 
Can it be that a giant symbol of a particular religion, declaring our nation’s 
religious unity as members of that faith, does not constitute an establishment of 
religion?  Few who take the Constitution seriously would say so, and it is difficult to 
imagine a favorable result for this act were we able to put it before either the 
Framers of the Constitution themselves or the generation that adopted the 
Constitution.  It certainly would fail both the Lemon and endorsement tests.   
Yet it seems that it would pass the coercion test,79 under either its force-of-law-
and-threat-of-penalty or peer-pressure-and-psychological-coercion models.  No one, 
after all, has to look at or admire any particular government monument.  Because the 
money was private, no taxpayer support contributed to it.  Because it is in neither a 
residential neighborhood nor a school, no one is captive in its presence.  If the 
coercion test cannot give a reliable answer to such an extreme hypothetical, its 
usefulness in testing government speech under the Establishment Clause cannot be 
great.80 
                                                           
 77 See, e.g., Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal 
Inculcation, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 417, 483 (2009) (after reviewing the modern status of the 
test, Professor Strasser concludes that “it is simply unconscionable for the Court to offer such 
a confused and confusing jurisprudence.”). 
 78 This rather rare title for Jesus of Nazareth seems to have first appeared in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence with the attempt of some Kentucky counties to post the Ten 
Commandments in their courthouses.  See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 899 
(2005).  The title was used in a motion to adjourn the Commonwealth Legislature in 1993 in 
honor of Jesus in this capacity.   
 79 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation 
to Judeo-Christian Tolerance, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691, 704 (2010) (“A statue of Moroni 
in a park owned and administered by an overwhelmingly Mormon city is clearly an 
endorsement of Mormonism by the city, but it is not coercive, and thus apparently not a 
constitutional violation under Justice Kennedy’s favored Establishment Clause test.”). 
 80 This is not to say that proponents of the coercion test would vote to allow such a 
monument; virtually all are also advocates of a non-discriminatory, non-sectarian model of the 
Establishment Clause.  A monument so obviously favoring a single religion would 
presumably incur their wrath as well.  This mental experiment merely demonstrates that the 
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5.  Monotheism 
In the twin Ten Commandments cases of 2005,81 a new theory appeared.  Justice 
Scalia argued82 that use of the Ten Commandments in American public spaces was 
permissible because they represented, not a particular sect that was receiving favored 
treatment, but rather an American tradition of support for monotheism.83  Such a 
tradition, Justice Scalia proclaimed, was woven into our Constitutional fabric.  He 
even allowed this rule to perform an exclusionary function: “it is entirely clear from 
our Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard 
of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of 
devout atheists.”84 
Onlookers might find themselves either horrified or pleasantly impressed by this 
characterization.  For those who initially recoil from this formulation, one mitigating 
approach could conclude that this understanding of the Establishment Clause is a 
cousin, if not a sibling, of the ceremonial deism exception to the endorsement test.  It 
appears to rely on historical tradition85 and seems to stress a general popularity and 
inoffensiveness, just as the ceremonial deism exception did.86 
On reflection, though, the “monotheism test” is actually quite different from the 
ceremonial deism exception.  While ceremonial deism at least demands a broad level 
of inoffensive generality, the monotheism approach allows much more government 
speech that is sectarian, or at least limited to one or a few faiths.  Despite Justice 
Scalia’s protestation that the Ten Commandments are, essentially, the same as 
ceremonial deism,87 the same day he joined the opinion that acknowledged that “the 
Ten Commandments are religious—they were so viewed at their inception and so 
                                                           
coercion test simply does not add any analytical value when considering a case of government 
monumental speech. 
 81 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 
(2005). 
 82 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 83 See id. at 894 (“Historical practices thus demonstrate that there is a distance between the 
acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment of a religion.”). 
 84 Id. at 893. 
 85 See Kyle Duncan, Bringing Scalia’s Decalogue Dissent Down From the Mountain, 
2007 UTAH L. REV. 287 (2007) (arguing that Justice Scalia is merely using the tradition of 
monotheism as a historical baseline, and thus deferring to legislatures the primary 
responsibility for determining the further development government religious speech). 
 86 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 894 (arguing that all three Abrahamic religions venerate 
the Ten Commandments and noting that “[t]he three most popular religions in the United 
States, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-which combined account for 97.7% of all believers-
are monotheistic.”). 
 87 See id. (Justice Scalia argued that the embrace of the Ten Commandments made them 
“indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other religions is concerned, from 
publicly honoring God.”). 
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remain.”88  This list of ten rules is, of course, profoundly religious, and specific to 
particular faiths.89 
Justice Scalia’s “monotheism test” makes much of a supposed unity of the three 
Abrahamic faiths, but he never fully explains why a particular version of these rules 
is acceptable under this rubric.90 
As Justice Stevens pointed out in response, there is a complete and utter lack of 
evidence that the founding generation had a uniform view of what was meant by the 
phrase “establishment of religion.”91  Some framers certainly sought a large role for 
religion in public life; others shunned it.92  To pretend they had a common view 
“stretches the evidence beyond tensile capacity.”93  Indeed, to the extent that some of 
the Framers and ratifiers sought an increased place for religion in American public 
life, it was not on behalf of some generic, murky monotheism.  As Justice Stevens 
noted: “history shows that the religion of concern to the Framers was not that of the 
monotheistic faiths generally, but Christianity in particular, a fact that no Member of 
this Court takes as a premise for construing the Religion Clauses.”94 
                                                           
 88 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (reading the Commandments makes this 
unavoidably clear: the first four Commandments outline particular requirements of religious 
faith and practice). 
 89 Indeed, there are sectarian differences that matter among the versions of the 
Commandments.  See id. at 718 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 90 In a fascinating footnote, Justice Scalia acknowledges that there is a potential limit to 
the posting of the Ten Commandments.  The note rewards consideration in full: 
This is not to say that a display of the Ten Commandments could never constitute an 
impermissible endorsement of a particular religious view.  The Establishment Clause 
would prohibit, for example, governmental endorsement of a particular version of the 
Decalogue as authoritative.  Here the display of the Ten Commandments alongside 
eight secular documents, and the plaque’s explanation for their inclusion, make clear 
that they were not posted to take sides in a theological dispute.   
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 894, n.4.   
Note that the last sentence is oddly disconnected from what precedes it.  The choice of a 
particular version of the Ten Commandments would be prohibited, the Justice tells us, because 
that would be an endorsement of a sect.  The display at issue was permissible, though, not 
because it did not pick a particular version of the Ten Commandments—which it of course 
did—but because it surrounded the commandments with “secular documents.”   Thus in this 
footnote, he acknowledges as problematic an action that would violate Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement test.  He then turns, unironically, to the purpose prong of the Lemon test, as 
formulated in Cnty. of Alleghany, to save the display. 
 91 Id. at 879. 
 92 Some of the most important figures of our history might well fall into Justice Scalia’s 
category of “believers in unconcerned deities,” see FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 159-61 (2003) (identifying a list of Deists that 
includes Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton).   
 93 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 879. 
 94 Id. at 880.  (Justice Stevens also quotes Justice Story, for whom the Establishment 
Clause was meant “not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or 
infidelity, by prostrating Christianity, but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects.”  Id.). 
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This observation shows the real difficulty with the monotheism test.  If a 
historical exception is carved out for monotheism—indeed, a monotheism seemingly 
limited to the three Abrahamic faiths—it is difficult to find either its historical roots 
or its contemporary stopping point.  Justice Scalia’s spirited writing cannot 
overcome a complete lack of evidence that the mostly-Christian Framers uniformly 
saw themselves as coreligionists with Jews, to say nothing of Muslims.  Those who 
sought a favored place for religion sought it for Christianity, not “monotheism.”  If 
one allowed Justice Scalia’s test to be the standard, though, further thought 
experiments demonstrate the difficulty of accepting Abrahamic monotheism as a 
test.  All three faiths feature angels and devils.  Would a national monument praising 
angels for their help, or denouncing the works of devils, truly not violate the 
Constitution’s prohibition on a law respecting an establishment of religion?95 
B.  Why the “Tests” Fail 
1.  Neutrality is Impossible 
It is possible, though, that such a test cannot exist.  Since the proclamation in 
Everson, the Court has sought to impose a condition of neutrality in the area of 
religion as a primary mandate of the Establishment Clause.96  I have argued 
elsewhere that it is a truth recognized from ancient times that something cannot be 
neutral between a thing and its denial: one cannot occupy the ground in between a 
horse and a non-horse, because no such ground exists.97  Much the same could be 
true of government speech about religion.  It may be that there is nothing wrong with 
the particular tests used by members of the Court that accounts for their failure.  It 
may be impossible to find a neutral position between religion and non-religion 
because no such position exists.  A court decision that allows government speech 
about religion favors religion; a court decision that forbids such speech favors non-
religion.98 
Some scholars who defend neutrality recognize this problem, but propose, as a 
baseline, that the government avoid religious speech.99  In this way, they argue, the 
                                                           
 95 See supra Part II.A.4 (as with the case of the giant cross I posit to test the limits of the 
coercion test, a prominent monument to angels may not trouble some readers.  I recognize the 
danger of rhetorical questions.  It remains my belief, though, that most readers, like most 
Supreme Court Justices, would find such a monument troubling).   
 96 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government . . . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion 
over another.”). 
 97 See Bickers, supra note 12. 
 98 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1842 (2009) (“If any interpretive question simply turns on a 
choice between secular individualism and religious communitarianism, then in any 
Establishment Clause controversy, the state is taking sides between the forces of 
progressivism and religious traditionalism.”). 
 99 Professor Laycock’s substantive neutrality seems to require this result.  See, e.g., 
Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 72 (2007) 
(arguing that monetary aid to religious schools is permitted by substantive neutrality’s 
protection of individual choice, but government religious speech is not). 
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government truly is able to avoid promoting either religion or non-religion.100  The 
failure of this approach is that it could work in a hypothetical new country without 
any history.  One can certainly imagine a place of deliberate settlement, such as a 
colony in space, in which the original inhabitants require their government to avoid 
all mention, favorable or unfavorable, of matters of religion. 
That is not the United States, however, and this avoidance solution avoids no 
difficulties.101  The historical reality is that the United States was settled by peoples 
who brought their religion with them102 and conducted their self-governance 
accordingly.  Over the centuries the American people have enacted religious mottoes 
for state government units,103 erected religious monuments in public spaces,104 and 
named cities after saints and divinities.105  Many of those past acts of governmental 
communication remain: a requirement of avoidance, enforced seriously, would force 
the courts to remove those tangible reminders of the past.106  Changing of the name 
of a city or removing a monument with a backhoe is not, in the eyes of many 
religious observers, neutral between religion and non-religion.107 
                                                           
 100 The opposite view is taken by some other scholars.  See, e.g., Richard M. Esenberg, 
Must God Be Dead or Irrelevant: Drawing a Circle that Lets Me In, 18 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1, 27 (2009) (“The point is not that the failure to include religious perspectives ought 
to be a constitutional violation, but that doctrine that prohibits, or significantly restricts, their 
inclusion will not be neutral as between them and competing secular perspectives.”). 
 101 Indeed, one scholar has noted that all existing monuments have social lives and 
meanings, as well as legal ones, and uses that observation to argue powerfully for the 
continuation of the endorsement test.  See Blocher, supra note 67.  
 102 See, e.g., 3 FRANCIS THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR 
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 7, 3802 (1909) (The Mayflower 
Compact saw the Pilgrims covenant “[i]n the Presence of God and one another,” agreement 
between the Settlers at New Plymouth.  Even such “secular” colonies as Virginia brought with 
them the established Church of England, complete with a prohibition on the entry into the 
colony of those “suspected to affect the Superstition of the Church of Rome,” until they had 
sworn a loyalty oath, Second Charter of Virginia). 
 103 See, e.g., ACLU v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(the Establishment Clause is not violated by Ohio’s state motto, “With God, All Things Are 
Possible.”). 
 104 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688-89 (2005) (listing of appearances of the Ten 
Commandments and other religious representations at the Supreme Court and in other 
government monuments and buildings around Washington, D.C.). 
 105 This practice was most common in the Spanish colonies, accounting for the large 
number of “San” or “Santa” towns in the Southwest.  Religious naming was not unknown in 
other parts of the country, though, and there is charm in the fact that one of the preeminent 
cases in Establishment Clause interpretation took place in a city called Providence.  See Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1991). 
 106 See, e.g., Robinson v. Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995) (Edmond, Oklahoma, 
required to remove Cross from one quadrant of city seal); Webb v. Republic, 55 F. Supp. 2d 
994 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (Republic, Missouri, required to remove Christian fish symbol from city 
seal). 
 107 Indeed, this may be why courts shy away from the result.  Despite occasional changes to 
seals, I am aware of no compelled change to the name of any political subdivision. 
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2.  Favoritism is Undesirable 
But the situation grows worse when one examines the alternatives.  If true 
neutrality between religion and non-religion is impossible, favoritism of one over the 
other strikes many of us as unwise,108 and possibly dangerous.109  A regime that 
allows for untrammeled government religious speech begins to look a great deal 
different from a tolerant pluralism.  The presence of unmistakably religious imagery 
in official places makes most people so uncomfortable that even most groups 
proposing them do so under the color of an argument about history, philosophy, or a 
non-religion specific set of community values.110  There are some Americans—there 
have always been some Americans—who see this nation as a proper venue for 
pronouncing their particular understanding of religious truth.111  Such individuals 
remain a numerical minority, however, and must always contend against a devotion 
to the separation of religion and government that traces its life back to the beginning 
of our shared constitutional experience.112 
If the theocratization of the United States is an unsettling image, most Americans 
are equally appalled by the prospect of triumphalist non-religion.  The notion that all 
symbols of worship that have found their way into our public life must be removed 
                                                           
 108 Griffin, supra note 3, at 25, “The environment now mistakenly favors religion instead of 
religious liberty and fosters wars of religion instead of peaceful tolerance.” 
 109 One of Justice O’Connor’s final opinions in the Supreme Court expressed this concern 
eloquently: “when we see around the world the violent consequences of the assumption of 
religious authority by government, Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for 
constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private 
religious exercise to flourish.”  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 110 Part of this, no doubt, is tactical.  After the issuance of the Lynch v. Donnelly opinion, 
many a city or town lawyer likely advised her client by reference to the “reindeer rule,” 
reading that case to allow a crèche on public land only if it is neutralized by a sufficient 
number of secular symbols, such as Santa Claus and his reindeer team.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (listing the display that had a crèche as also featuring Santa and 
sleigh, a Christmas tree, “a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear”).  Commentators have 
generally focused on the reindeer for naming this particular facet of Establishment Clause 
doctrine, although there does seem to be some dispute about the number of reindeer required.  
Compare Gedicks, supra note 79, at 699 (“three-reindeer rule”), with Alberto B. Lopez, Equal 
Access and the Public Forum: Pinette’s Imbalance of Free Speech and Establishment, 55 
BAYLOR L. REV. 167, 195 (2003) (“two plastic reindeer rule”).   
 111 The apotheosis may have occurred in what would otherwise be characterized as an 
immigration or labor case.  Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892).  In holding that 
a prohibition on importing foreign workers did not apply to an Episcopal minister, Justice 
David Brewer famously intoned that “no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to 
any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people.”  Id. at 465.  Six pages of 
historical quotes about the importance of religion in American government later, Justice 
Brewer declared more specifically that “this is a Christian nation.”  Id. at 471. 
 112 See LAMBERT, supra note 92, at 238-39 (discussing the famous Article 11 of the Treaty 
with Tripoli of 1797, which declared that the U.S. government was “not in any sense founded 
on the Christian Religion”). 
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might well lead to a severe backlash.113  We are a nation with two national holidays 
that speak to religion, one specifically (Christmas) and the other generically 
(Thanksgiving).  We are a nation that still does little governmental business on the 
day of the week sacred to Christians (Sunday).114  Indeed, although retail activities 
flourish on Sundays in ways they once did not, there are still whole industries such 
as banking in which it is virtually impossible to conduct business on that day.115  Our 
communities and parks abound with statuary that has an at least oblique reference to 
religion.  The notion of all of it being changed—the statues removed, the work 
schedules altered, Christmas cancelled—is a bugbear hauled out by some advocacy 
groups to make rhetorical points or raise funds.116  That such changes are, to those 
not engaged in such advocacy, inconceivable only highlights the problem for 
constitutional law.  Indeed, skeptics on the Court have occasionally accused their 
colleagues of dodging the hard conclusions of their tests, for example by not using 
Lemon or by finding a ceremonial deism exception, simply to avoid facing the 
popular wrath that widespread adoption of non-religion might trigger.117  They may 
be right; even if they are not, there must be a better way for the Constitution to 
contend with this problem. 
Avoidance of hard conclusions seems to be the primary distinguisher among the 
various tests used by the Court.  The Lemon test and its endorsement gloss are 
ignored at times because they prohibit things the Court seems to wish to protect, 
such as legislative opening prayers118 or a Ten Commandments monument.119  The 
tests proposed as alternates, in turn, are not used consistently because they would 
                                                           
 113 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court does not apply a neutrality standard faithfully in Establishment Clause cases because it 
could not do so “without losing all that sustains it: the willingness of the people to accept its 
interpretation of the Constitution as definitive, in preference to the contrary interpretation of 
the democratically elected branches.”). 
 114 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5546 (1998), authorizing premium pay (25% above normal rates) 
for any federal employee required to work on Sunday, except those in other countries where a 
different day is designated as “the day of rest and worship.” 
 115 Although few jurisdictions prohibit much other than alcohol sales on Sundays any more, 
standing Supreme Court precedents hold that such “blue laws” do not violate the 
Establishment Clause.   McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).  See also Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 116 “We live in a culture increasingly hostile to Christians and their faith.  America has 
become a nation where public school students are prohibited from praying, acknowledging 
their dependence upon God, and forming religious clubs, where schools and communities are 
challenged from displaying nativity scenes, the Ten Commandments, and other symbols of 
our religious and moral heritage.”  Defending the Religious Freedom of Christians, THOMAS 
MORE LAW CENTER, http://www.thomasmore.org/qry/page.taf?id=38 (last visited April 17, 
2012). 
 117 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 890 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“the Court has not had the 
courage (or the foolhardiness) to apply the neutrality principle consistently.”). 
 118 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 119 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
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allow things that the Court seeks to prohibit, such as mandatory school prayer120 or 
the display of a crèche on a courthouse staircase.121 
This dichotomy actually suggests hope.  For if there is some divinable distinction 
between the times the Court backs away from the tests that are too harsh and the 
tests that are too yielding, we may be able to locate a principle that is just right.  
Before we can find that principle, we must turn next to the very odd procedural 
aspect of Establishment Clause challenges.   
III.  “THE ORDINARY PROCEEDINGS OF JUSTICE”:122 THE INCONSISTENCY OF 
CURRENT STANDING DOCTRINE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A.  The Usual Limit of Standing 
It is a commonplace to observe that the government must be neutral in religious 
matters.  As we have seen, for government religious speech, this uncontroversial 
statement is also problematic.  Likewise, it is a commonplace to note that a plaintiff 
seeking to change some government action must have standing to sue.123  The 
Constitution has long been read to incorporate such a requirement in Article III.124  
This idea is unsurprising.  Requiring trial participants to have a stake in the outcome 
seems fundamental to the traditional role of the common-law court.125 
In the modern era, though, this requirement has moved from a common-sense 
remark about how courts work to a Great Truth, a holy relic fundamental to our very 
Constitution.126  The Constitution nowhere contains the word “standing.”  The 
                                                           
 120 The history test would arguably permit such prayers.  See Brief for Respondents at 11, 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (No. 468), 1962 WL 115798 at *11 (justifying the 
Regents’ Prayer on the basis of “the history and growth of the United States”).  
 121 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (the crèche does not coerce anyone because those who 
disagree with the messages of religious symbols are “free to ignore them, or even to turn their 
backs”). 
 122 WESTPHALIA, supra note 1, at art. CXXIII. 
 123 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“When the suit is one 
challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that 
must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to 
establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the 
action (or forgone action) at issue.”).  The test for standing—that a plaintiff have suffered an 
injury, traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and redressable by the court—has been aptly 
labeled “trivially easy to state but notoriously hard to apply.” Richard Murphy, Abandoning 
Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule of Deference, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 943, 952 
(2008). 
 124 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“One of those landmarks, setting apart the “Cases” and 
“Controversies” that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III-”serv[ing] to identify 
those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process,”-is the doctrine 
of standing”) (citation omitted). 
 125 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009).  But cf. Cass Sunstein, What’s 
Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 172-
73 (1992) (arguing that the modern standing test is “a historical blunder”). 
 126 One commentator has identified a persistent problem in the area being the lack of a 
consistent purpose.  A group of justices (and hence, some opinions) take the purpose of the 
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requirement derives from the Article III definition of the jurisdiction of federal 
courts as “extending . . . [to] Cases . . . [and] Controversies.”127 
The Cases and Controversies requirement might only mark part of the 
jurisdiction of federal courts, and not create a constitutional barrier to those courts.  
At least one Framer, of considerable fame, seemed to believe that this was so.128  
Nonetheless, the Cases and Controversies clause has become, over the centuries, a 
requirement that a suitor in court must have an “actual case”129 to give him or her 
standing to sue.  This standing requirement has in turn come to include, as a 
constitutional matter, the need for the plaintiff to show an “injury-in-fact,”130 and 
perhaps even a “wallet injury.”131 
While there are certainly cases involving the Establishment Clause that present 
themselves as very ordinary for standing purposes, in many cases it has been quite 
difficult to figure out exactly what “injury-in-fact” exists.  The government’s 
decision to give money to “someone else,” but not to “me,” certainly seems like a 
“wallet injury.”132  The government’s decision to have prayer in public schools, 
however, or position a crèche inside a courthouse,133 seems not to take any 
recognizable amount of anyone’s money.  To opine about the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause in these cases, the courts must first allow some plaintiff to sue.  
                                                           
standing doctrine to be the separation of powers.  Murphy, supra note 123, at 946.  Another 
group (and hence, other opinions) believe that standing guarantees sharply adversarial 
proceedings by allowing into court only the right plaintiff.  Id. at 947.  Depending on which 
view one takes will go a long way toward determining one’s feelings about cases such as 
Flast, discussed infra Part III.B. 
 127 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60. 
 128 As President, George Washington famously sent the Supreme Court a request for advice 
on a series of issues in international law.  Chief Justice John Jay politely rebuffed the father of 
the country, arguing that because the three branches were “in certain respects checks upon 
each other,” the judiciary could not offer opinions outside of the Case or Controversy 
requirement.  William E. Wiecek, The Debut of Modern Constitutional Procedure, 26 REV. 
LITIG. 641, 648 (2007).  Jay’s answer to the question—or refusal to answer the question—has 
received significant attention.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 728, n. 17 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Oddly, less attention is usually given to the fact that Washington 
asked for the advice, indicating his belief that answering it would not be improper for the 
Court.  
 129 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976). 
 130 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 131 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  
 132 Such cases pose their own standing limitations, however.  See Ariz. Christian Sch. 
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011), discussed infra notes 176-179 and 
accompanying text. 
 133 Frequently such items were gifts from private organizations.  See e.g., Cnty. of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 587 (1989) (menorah displayed at City-County building 
was owned by private Jewish group).  Even where government bodies spent money on them, 
the amounts were usually de minimis.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) 
(crèche initially cost less than $1,500, no maintenance funds were spent on it for a decade, and 
the cost to set it up and take it down each Christmas was about $20). 
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As Professors Lupu and Tuttle have observed, “[i]t is unimaginable that courts 
would adjudicate claims of psychological injury by observers of other constitutional 
wrongs, such as cruel punishments or patently unfair trials.”134  Yet courts in 
religious challenges have done precisely that.135  The Supreme Court has done so in 
the Establishment Clause area in two ways: a carefully built exception in the doctrine 
for one type of case, and a studious looking-away for another. 
B.  Paying Taxes and Flast 
The doctrinal exception allowing standing in Establishment Clause cases was 
explained by the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen.136  There, the Court announced a 
quite surprising principle.  The Court said that a plaintiff would have standing when 
challenging “allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and spending programs.”137  
This principal is not interesting because it is conceptually unsound: indeed, it is 
possible to imagine a system of ordered (if arguably unwieldy) liberty in which all 
taxpayers have the right to hale the government into court to make it demonstrate the 
constitutionality of its expenditures.138 
That, however, has not been the experience of the United States.  In a series of 
cases, beginning with Frothingham v. Mellon in 1923, the Supreme Court has taken 
the position that status as a taxpayer is simply not enough to convey standing.139  
That a taxpayer alleges some wrongfulness in a government appropriation, which 
she or he is coerced to pay for in small part, is not enough.140  The Court rejects such 
                                                           
 134 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom From Religion 
Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
115, 119 (2008). 
 135 “Establishment Clause standing doctrines are looser than most, for the prudential reason 
that the Clause would not be judicially enforced if traditional Article III rules applied.”  Id. 
 136 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 137 Id. at 101. 
 138 Indeed, many other nations are far less stringent in blocking access to their courts.  The 
German Constitution allows a Land (State) government to seek an opinion whether a federal 
law in an area of concurrent federal-state authority is no longer necessary, GRUNDGESETZ FÜR 
DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949,  
BGBI  I at art. 93(2) (Ger.).  Similarly, the Indian Constitution provides explicitly for the 
President to seek the advice of the Supreme Court when it is “expedient,” INDIA CONST. art. 
143.  More significantly, the Indian courts have expanded access to the courts by developing 
the concept of “citizen standing,” which allows any citizen to sue to enforce duties owed to 
them by the government because of their citizenship, without a more specific showing of 
injury.  See Michael G. Faure & A.V. Raja, Effectiveness of Environmental Public Interest 
Litigation in India: Determining the Key Variables, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 239, 249 
(2010).  
 139 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (taxpayer had no standing to contest the 
constitutionality of the Maternity Act, spending federal money to reduce the mortality of 
mothers and infants). 
 140 For the Frothingham Court, this was in part a function of the separation of powers.  
Looking through forms of words to the substance of their complaint, it is merely that 
officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will execute 
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suits with regularity, often while remarking that “the alleged injury is not ‘concrete 
and particularized,’ but instead a grievance the taxpayer ‘suffers in some indefinite 
way in common with people generally,’”141 or “[t]his is surely the kind of a 
generalized grievance described in both Frothingham and Flast since the impact on 
him is plainly undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the public.’”142 
As noted above, Flast specifically allowed just such a common grievance to be 
brought to the Court.143  Why, then, should the Establishment Clause be different?  
This puzzle was not really solved by Flast, which simply remarked that “the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does specifically limit the taxing and 
spending power conferred by Art. I.”144  The Court noted the history of the fear of 
government support of particular sects,145 but it also referred to the problem that 
would be caused if taxpayers had no standing to challenge such spending: “[t]he 
logic of the Government’s argument would compel it to concede that a taxpayer 
would lack standing even if Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional 
conduct as providing funds for the construction of churches for particular sects.”146 
But the former argument, that the Constitution limits the spending powers of 
Congress, is true of all of the powers of Congress.  There is no textual reason for 
treating the Establishment Clause as a limit on federal spending sufficient to grant 
standing when other guarantees such as the Free Speech Clause, the Search and 
Seizure Clause, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause are not.  The second 
argument is, on reflection, even more jarring.  It is true that if taxpayers cannot 
challenge spending for church-building then no one can.  It is equally true that such 
absence of remedy has simply not availed plaintiffs in other areas.147  Those 
                                                           
an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent.  
To do so would be, not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of 
authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department, an authority 
which plainly we do not possess. 
Id. at 488-89. 
 141 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 142 U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974). 
 143 The Court in Flast never identified specifically the amount of money at issue from the 
provision of federal funds through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.  See 
generally, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).  As the Act allowed the federal Commissioner 
of Education to make grants to the States for assistance to low-income families, which the 
States could make available for use in both public and private schools, it is difficult to imagine 
that any particular taxpayer had a significant amount of “wallet injury” from the act.  See Id. at 
85-87.  
 144 Id. at 105. 
 145 Id. at 103 (“Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those 
who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and 
spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in 
general.”). 
 146 Id. at 98 n. 17. 
 147 The observation of the Court on this point when rejecting a request by a taxpayer for an 
accounting of the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency merits consideration in full: 
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disappointed with the lack of judicial intervention are simply told to take their 
dispute to the political arenas.148 
Conceptually, the injuries to plaintiffs such as Florence Flast, who sought to stop 
federal spending on textbooks for religious schools,149 are not obvious.  If the injury 
is conceived as a Wallet Injury—the government improperly taking money—it is 
difficult to see how she suffered differently from Harriet Frothingham, who sought 
to stop federal spending to reduce mortality among mothers and children.150  Money, 
albeit in a vanishingly small amount, was unquestionably taken from both taxpayers 
for spending on programs they believed violated the Constitution.151  The Court’s 
proclamation in Flast that standing does not exist when the plaintiff challenges 
merely “an incidental expenditure of funds in the administration of an essentially 
regulatory statute” is an ipse dixit.152  The Court announced that specific prohibitions 
of the Bill of Rights are limits to Congress different from a lack of authority under 
Article I, despite the textual evidence of the Tenth Amendment seeming to make the 
opposite point.153 
                                                           
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do 
so.  In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate 
these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the 
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.  Any other 
conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the 
nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the 
conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts.  The 
Constitution created a representative Government with the representatives directly 
responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six years; that the 
Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable 
the citizen who is not satisfied with the ‘ground rules’ established by the Congress for 
reporting expenditures of the Executive Branch.  Lack of standing within the narrow 
confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the 
political forum or at the polls.  Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the 
traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for 
changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a 
sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in 
performing duties committed to them. 
U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
 148 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974) 
(hereinafter Reservists Committee) ( “The legislative function is inherently general rather than 
particular and is not intended to be responsive to adversaries asserting specific claims or 
interests peculiar to themselves.”). 
 149 Flast, 392 U.S. at 85. 
 150 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923). 
 151 This did not go unnoticed at the time: “how can it be said that Mrs. Frothingham’s 
interests in her suit were, as a consequence of her choice of a constitutional claim, necessarily 
less intense than those, for example, of the present appellants?” Flast, 392 U.S. at 124 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 152 Justice Harlan noted the “formidable obscurity of the Court’s categories.”  Id. 
 153 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST., amend. 
X.  The Flast Court, in characterizing Mrs. Frothingham’s complaint as “attempting to assert 
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If, on the other hand, the injury to Ms. Flast is what Justice Scalia has called 
Psychic Injury,154 it is difficult to see why the Establishment Clause should be an 
area so different from the rest of the Constitution that it allows for such suits.  The 
Court has sometimes allowed cases to go forward in this area using something that 
looks much like Psychic Injury: it is difficult to find a non-psychic injury from 
merely seeing a government religious display.155 
The dissonance between the Establishment Clause and everything else in 
standing doctrine has not gone unnoticed in the Court.  This is especially true of 
those who seek a less aggressive use of the Establishment Clause, particularly in the 
area of government religious speech.  Over the years the Flast doctrine—which at its 
announcement might have been quite expansive156—was limited in significant 
ways.157 
In 2007, a divided Court offered a further twist to the standing doctrine in future 
Establishment Clause cases that further reduced the scope of Flast.158  In considering 
the challenge by a group named Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.159 to the 
President’s Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,160 the justices were 
faced squarely with the possible elimination of the Flast incongruity.  Freedom from 
Religion Foundation (FRF) contended that the president and other executive branch 
officers made speeches using “religious imagery” and that this violated the 
                                                           
the State’s interest in their legislative prerogatives,” 392 U.S. at 105, simply elided over the 
fact that the Amendment recognizes the retention of power in people as well as states. 
 154 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 155 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The only injury 
to him is that he takes offense at seeing the monument as he passes it on his way to the Texas 
Supreme Court Library.”). 
 156 The test in Flast had required that the plaintiff allege that “his tax money is being 
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections,” Flast, 392 U.S. at 106, 
not merely the Establishment Clause. 
 157 The most severe early limit was probably the confident pronouncement in 1982 that the 
plaintiffs challenging the transfer of real property worth one-half million dollars to an 
Assembly of God college lacked standing because the transfer “was not an exercise of 
authority conferred by the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8 . . . [but rather] . . .  an 
evident exercise of Congress’ power under the Property Clause.”  Valley Forge Christian Coll. 
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 480 (1982). 
 158 Hein, 551 U.S. at 587. 
 159 As their name indicates, Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. is a group which 
seeks to reduce the presence of religion in the public square.  Among their judicial campaigns 
have been struggles against prayer rooms in the Illinois State Capitol, see Van Zandt v. 
Thompson, 839 F.2d 1213, 1220 (7th Cir. 1988); a statue of Jesus Christ in a public park, see 
FRF v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2000); and a crèche atop the roof of a 
city hall, see FRF v. City of Green Bay, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022 (E.D. Wis. 2008). 
 160 The President created the office by Executive Order, charging it with the responsibility 
“to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for the Federal Government’s comprehensive 
effort to enlist, equip, enable, empower, and expand the work of faith-based and other 
community organizations to the extent permitted by law.”  Exec. Order No. 13199, 3 C.F.R. § 
752 (2001). 
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Establishment Clause.161  The Office responded, and the District Court agreed, that 
FRF did not have standing to raise the claim.162  The Seventh Circuit reversed, and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.163 
FRF lost.  This was unsurprising: a decision in their favor would have been 
extraordinarily activist for the Court, asserting a right to enter into the meetings held 
by officers of the executive branch, and to prohibit them from talking to religious 
groups or about matters of faith.164  Such a result never seemed terribly likely.165 
The way in which FRF lost, though, was noteworthy.  The Court held that they 
lacked standing to sue.  Justice Alito’s plurality opinion, although recognizing the 
similarity to the Flast exception, chose to “decline this invitation to extend its 
holding to encompass discretionary Executive Branch expenditures.”166  The 
plurality simply characterized spending by the executive as different, for the purpose 
of the Establishment Clause, from spending by the legislature. 
This distinction was lost on the other justices.  The dissenters objected, noting 
that it is the plaintiff who ought to be the focus of the inquiry into injury.167  They 
rejected the characterization that FRF sought an “extension” of Flast.168  They noted 
that the separation of powers concerns that the plurality marshaled on behalf of the 
executive should have been precisely the same as those afforded the legislature.169  
Defying Justice Alito’s own portrayal of the claim of FRF as an extreme case, they 
set loose their own contrary parade of horribles, including the building of a chapel by 
the Department of Health and Human Services.170 
If the dissenters were unconvinced by the plurality’s executive-legislative 
distinction for Flast, though, it was Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the result that 
most vividly captured dissatisfaction with this characterization.  His opinion attacked 
the distinction between the sources of funding as having “no mooring in our 
tripartite test for Article III standing.”171  His proposed solution to what he viewed as 
                                                           
 161 Hein, 551 U.S. at 592. 
 162 Id. at 596. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 611 (noting separation-of-powers concern). 
 165 Some constitutional adjudication includes the marshaling of a “parade of horribles” to 
demonstrate the limits of the doctrine at issue.  In this case, however, the plurality noted that 
the parade was already included in the plaintiff’s challenge itself, id. at 611 (amended 
complaint included the content of Presidential speeches as well as the public appearances of 
other officials). 
 166 Hein, 551 U.S. at 609. 
 167 “Here, there is no dispute that taxpayer money in identifiable amounts is funding 
conferences, and these are alleged to have the purpose of promoting religion.”  Id. at 639 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 640. 
 171 Id. at 630 (Scalia, J., concurring ). 
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a “meaningless and disingenuous distinction,”172 was the opposite of that taken by 
the dissent.  For Justice Scalia, the logical approach was to recognize that Flast had 
never made sense as a species of Wallet Injury, but was actually an example of the 
otherwise-prohibited category of Psychic Injury.173  For him,174 the solution was 
overturning Flast once and for all, but the plurality was “beating Flast to a pulp and 
then sending it out to the lower courts weakened, denigrated, more incomprehensible 
than ever, and yet somehow technically alive.”175 
Justice Scalia’s characterization accurately depicted the state of the law.  After 
Hein, Flast remained a viable precedent; it just offered little help to most plaintiffs.  
The Court took up the issue yet again in 2011.  This time the Court considered 
whether state taxpayers had standing to challenge the provision of dollar for dollar 
tax credits awarded by the state in return for contributions to School Tuition 
Organizations,176 many of which allegedly used the money received to offer private 
school scholarships in religiously discriminatory ways.177  The Court found that the 
Flast exception was “inapplicable,”178 because of the “distinction between 
governmental expenditures and tax credits.”179 
C.  Looking Away and the Lower Courts 
In Establishment Clause challenges, Flast’s carved-out exception for taxpayers is 
not even the most startling anomaly.  In cases challenging religious displays, the 
Court has sometimes allowed to pass without comment challenges that seem based 
on a truly insignificant interest.  For example, when residents of Pawtucket, Rhode 
Island, joined by their local American Civil Liberties Union chapter, challenged the 
inclusion of a crèche in a seasonal public display, the Court never considered 
standing at all.180  The Court moved directly to the purpose of the Establishment 
Clause,181 and the word “standing” appears in the opinion only three times, and never 
as a requirement of justiciability.182  Interestingly, the District Court had dispensed 
with the requirement of standing by noting that “[e]ven before Flast v. Cohen 
recognized the standing of federal taxpayers to challenge governmental expenditures 
on establishment clause grounds, municipal taxpayer standing had been permitted in 
                                                           
 172 Id. at 633. 
 173 Id. at 623. 
 174 And Justice Thomas, who joined his opinion.  Id. 
 175 Id. at 636. 
 176 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011). 
 177 Id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 178 Id. at 1448. 
 179 Id. at 1447.  Once again, Justice Scalia took the time to note separately that Flast 
remains for him a “misguided decision,” id. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 180 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). 
 181 Id. at 671. 
 182 Id. at 687 (“a person’s standing in the political community”), at 695 (“a crèche standing 
alone”), and at 706 (“people standing at the two bus shelters”). 
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this area.”183  Thus there was for the trial court “little doubt”184 that the plaintiffs had 
alleged a sufficient injury despite the fact that the uncontroverted testimony was that 
the city had bought the crèche eight years earlier for less than $1,400, and spent less 
than $40 each year on maintenance and supplies.185 
In more recent cases, the Court has seemingly gone even farther afield, allowing 
cases to proceed to the merits on the basis of what appears to be no more than devout 
interest.  When Texas lawyer Thomas Van Orden challenged the placement of a Ten 
Commandments monument by the state Capitol in Austin, the plurality rejected his 
challenge substantively without pausing to inquire into his right to bring it.186  
Remarkably, the District Court had gone even farther to allow the suit than the court 
in Lynch, finding it appropriate to proceed to the merits “[i]n light of the very liberal 
interpretation which the courts have given to the concept of standing in 
Establishment Clause cases.”187  This is decidedly unusual: it has long been 
axiomatic that being particularly concerned about the action of government simply 
will not convey standing.188 
The recent battle over a cross in the desert189 offered the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to clarify the standing doctrine.  The Court declined to do so. 
Buono was an unusual case.  In a nutshell, a group of World War I veterans had 
erected a wooden cross on a stone called Sunset Rock, in a part of the Mojave Desert 
that is owned by the Federal Preserve.190  These veterans had fought and survived the 
War to End All Wars; they asked no one’s permission.  To explain the memorial 
nature of the cross, they added wooden signs that said “The Cross, Erected in 
Memory of the Dead of All Wars,” and “Erected 1934 by Members of Veterans of 
Fore[ig]n Wars, Death Valley post 2884.”191 
                                                           
 183 Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.R.I. 1981) (citation omitted). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 1156. 
 186 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 695 (2005).  One Justice did note that “[t]he only 
injury to him is that he takes offense at seeing the monument as he passes it on his way to the 
Texas Supreme Court Library,” id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring), but the conclusions he 
drew from that observation concerned the substance of the Establishment Clause, not 
justiciability. 
 187 Van Orden v. Perry, 2002 WL 32737462, 2 (W.D. Tex. 2002). 
 188 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“a mere ‘interest in a 
problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the 
organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself”).  Judge Posner has 
offered a colorful example of the issue, see DePuy, Inc. v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 384 F. 
Supp. 2d 1237, 1240 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  See also Aurora Loan Servs. v. Craddieth, 442 F.3d 
1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating “there is a sense in which I am ‘injured’ when I become 
upset by reading about the damage caused that fine old vineyard in Burgundy by a band of 
marauding teetotalers, yet that injury would not be an injury that conferred standing to sue 
under Article III”). 
 189 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1805 (2010). 
 190 Id. at 1811. 
 191 Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d. 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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Years went by, and the harsh desert climate had the predictable erosive effect on 
the humble cross.  It disappeared into the mists of time, although later characters in 
the story—perhaps interested in preserving the memory of World War I, and perhaps 
not—replaced the cross periodically.192  Apparently, they did not replace the signs.193  
By the time the case drew near to the Supreme Court, the cross at issue was one that 
had been erected in 1998, was made of metal pipes painted white, was between five 
and eight feet tall, and had no explanatory signs.194  It was about eleven miles from 
the nearest interstate highway, and was visible for about one hundred yards of 
driving on Cima Road, a narrow blacktop road that traveled through the federal 
preserve.195 
The case came to the Supreme Court in a way that illustrates a broader theme in 
religious display cases.  The 1934 veterans with their simple symbol in an out-of-
the-way place do not seem to have been seeking warfare.  The same could not be 
said for the forces which began contending at the site at the end of the twentieth 
century.  By then, the cross had attracted a fervent supporter in Henry Sandoz, a 
local resident.  At his own expense, he replaced the old rugged cross with the latest 
thing in metalwork.  In place of the humble wooden symbol pinned into a natural 
crevice, he erected a cross made of painted metal pipe, ensuring its security by 
drilling holes for support brackets into the face of Sunset Rock.196 
At the same time, the cross gained its first recorded foes.  A retired National Park 
Service employee, writing under an alias, asked the Park Service for permission to 
erect a Buddhist stupa on a nearby spot of land.197 
The next chapter in the story might have been the most predictable.  Faced with a 
request for equal treatment with a monument that it did not seem to know much 
about,198 the government might have acted in a pluralistic way, allowing minority as 
well as majority faiths to use this otherwise idle bit of federal land.  Alternatively, 
the Executive Branch could endeavor to exclude all expressions of faith from this 
tiny spot.  Unsurprisingly, the Park Service chose the latter course, informing Mr. 
Buono that the stupa could not be built and announcing plans to remove the cross.199 
Then Congress got involved.200 
                                                           
 192 Id. 
 193 Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d at 1072. 
 197 The former employee, Harold Hoops, identified himself in the letter as “Sherpa San 
Harold Horpa.”  Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. 
 198 The Park Service responded to the “Sherpa San Harold Horpa” letter by announcing its 
intention to remove the cross.  When the American Civil Liberties Union sent what might be 
called a warning letter threatening suit if the cross were not removed, the Superintendent for 
Ecosystem Management ordered an investigation into the history of the cross.  Id.  This 
investigation concluded that the cross was not sufficiently historical for protection in the 
Register of Historic Places.  Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
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In the version of constitutional governance often taught in American schools, 
there is a carefully honed balance among the branches.  Congress, in this view, acts 
as the voice of the people, taking legislative steps upon considered deliberation.  In 
reality, of course, members of Congress, having to run for reelection consistently, 
make many decisions to placate particular lobbies, interest groups, and voting 
blocks.   
So it was with the Sunrise Rock Cross.  It quickly became a cause célèbre among 
certain sections of the Christian community (largely, although not exclusively, 
Evangelicals).  Local residents rejected requests from the Park Service to remove the 
cross voluntarily.201  Some of them lobbied Congress, and found an eager supporter 
in Representative Jerry Lewis.202  He added an amendment to the December 2000 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, forbidding any use of federal funds for the 
removal of the cross.203  The following year Congress acted again, this time 
designating the cross as an official World War I memorial and authorizing funds for 
the installation of a new plaque.204 
Thwarted now by both the Executive Branch—which would not allow the 
symbol of a minority faith to be placed on public land—and the Legislative 
Branch—which would not allow the symbol of the majority faith to be removed—
opponents of the cross turned to the Judicial Branch.  So began the Jarndyce-like 
course of litigation205 involving a few feet of pipe in a desert, an exercise in legal 
battles that went on for years before reaching the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The District Court found that the presence of the cross on federal land “conveys a 
message of endorsement of religion.”206  While the appeal was underway,207 
Congress again stepped in, this time requiring that the land in question be transferred 
to the Barstow post of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.208  Congress required the new 
owners to maintain the property as a war memorial, or it would revert to the 
ownership of the United States.209 
                                                           
 201 Id. at 1205-06. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 1206. 
 204 Id. at 1206-07. 
 205 “Jarndyce v. Jarndyce” is the seemingly endless case in the Court of Chancery invented 
by Charles Dickens in BLEAK HOUSE, referred to by Chief Justice Roberts in Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600 (2011).  
 206  Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. 
 207 The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court.  Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 
2004).  
 208 Pub. Law No. 108-87 § 8121 (2003).  In return for the one acre on which the cross 
stood, the U.S. would receive a five-acre parcel of land from Mr. and Mrs. Henry Sandoz, 
who had erected the cross at issue. 
 209 Id.  This part of the legislation appears to reflect congressional understanding of the 
contours of the Establishment Clause.  Surely it is an odd choice otherwise to privatize a 
national monument, and demand its return if the private owner ever puts it to a non-memorial 
use. 
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The litigation resumed.  Pointing to several Ninth Circuit cases in which such 
land “transfers” were held to be invalid attempts to Establishment Clause 
violations,210 the plaintiffs went back to the District Court asking for the transfer to 
be enjoined.211  The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and enjoined the 
transfer, and the Circuit Court again affirmed.212 
The battle now seemed to be perfectly joined for a resolution of the standing 
issue.213  Buono had surely not suffered any Wallet Injury, and any recognition of an 
“injury-in-fact” would require a recognition that Psychic Injury sufficed to grant 
standing, at least in Establishment Clause cases.214  Indeed, because any argument 
that traffic patterns required one to pass near the monument would be specious, the 
primary injury for the plaintiffs seemed to be that they knew the cross was out there 
in the desert.215  It seemed possible that the Court would find that, like FRF, they 
simply had no standing to challenge this particular government action.216 
                                                           
 210 See, e.g., Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 211 Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 212 Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007).  Even this discussion has been an 
oversimplification of what Justice Kennedy termed a four stage process for the litigation.  See 
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010). 
 213 An effort more than a decade earlier had failed.  When the Court declined to hear a case 
involving the official city seal of Edmond, Oklahoma, three justices had dissented from the 
denial of certiorari, quoting language from Valley Forge noting that the plaintiffs “fail to 
identify any personal injury . . . other than the psychological consequence presumably 
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”  Edmond v. Robinson, 517 
U.S. 1201, 1202 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  As noted supra note 157, Valley Forge 
was a case finding that property transfers did not fall within the Flast exception for 
expenditures of money.  Nonetheless this language raises the dramatic tension between what 
the Flast-limiting cases have said about standing and the treatment of standing in cases 
involving government speech. 
 214 Noting the lack of discussion of the issue at the Supreme Court, many lower courts had 
applied just such a standard.  As one appellate judge wrote, “the Supreme Court’s consistent 
adjudication of religious display . . . cases over a span of decades suggests that the Court has 
thought it obvious that the plaintiffs in those matters had standing.”   Newdow v. Roberts, 603 
F.3d 1002, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment).  Judge Kavanaugh 
pointed also to the remarkable fact that in the Supreme Court’s “highly controversial and 
divisive” opinions in these display cases, “none of the dissenters . . . ever contended that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing.”  Id. 
 215 As discussed supra note 188 and accompanying text, being aware that there is a 
violation of law is never enough.  In rejecting a challenge to the Texas Governor’s 
endorsement of a prayer rally, one district judge noted that “mere knowledge that Governor 
Perry will participate in a prayer rally is likewise insufficient to confer standing.”  Freedom 
From Religion Found. v. Perry, 2011 WL 3269339 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 
 216 Over the course of the litigation, the White House had changed the party affiliation of 
its primary occupant, but the position of the United States did not change.  As one gifted 
writer noted about the Obama Administration possibly having difficulties taking a position 
initially advanced by the Bush Administration, “the institutional interest of the United States 
in No One Ever Having Standing makes this an easy case for them,”  John P. Elwood, What 
Were They Thinking?, 12 GREEN BAG 429, 448 (2009). 
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Anyone in hope of resolution to the standing conundrum in Buono was doomed 
to disappointment.  The plurality focused its inquiry on standing to sue to enforce the 
original injunction.  The issue of standing in the original case simply was not before 
the Court.217  Several justices were displeased with this resolution of the question.  
Although Justice Scalia agreed that standing to seek the original injunction (to 
remove the cross) was not before the court, the relief now sought (to block the 
transfer) was an expansion of the original injunction, and hence subject to a new 
standing determination.218  In that analysis, Justice Scalia argued that Buono came up 
short because of the nature of his pleading, “even assuming that being ‘deeply 
offended’ by a religious display (and taking steps to avoid seeing it) constitutes a 
cognizable injury.”219  In response, Justice Stevens argued that Buono would have 
standing even if the injunction at issue were a new one, because of his claim that he 
was “unable to freely use the area of the Preserve around the cross,” because he was 
offended by it.220 
This studied looking-away from the standing problem by the Supreme Court has 
simply not helped.221  As Judge Kavanaugh noted,222 it seems extremely unlikely that 
the Supreme Court simply overlooked the standing problem while deciding cases 
that caused fierce conflicts inside and outside the Court.223  The problem is made 
more serious by the Court’s repeated invocations of two principles that seem to point 
to opposite results in this situation.  On the one hand, the Court has an obligation to 
inquire into standing even if neither party contests it and the lower courts never 
addressed it.224  On the other, the Court frequently reminds us that we are not to draw 
conclusions from their silence on jurisdictional issues. 225 
It is no wonder other federal judges sometimes express frustration over the lack 
of consistent guidance.  As Judge Demoss noted: 
                                                           
 217 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1814. 
 218 Id. at 1825 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
 219 Id. at 1826-27 (emphasis added). 
 220 Id. at 1830 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 221 Not only did the doctrinal contours not improve, but the desert did not even grow more 
peaceful.  Less than a fortnight after the Supreme Court opinion, person or persons unknown 
simply took the cross from Sunrise Rock.  See Randal C. Archibold, Cross at Center of Legal 
Dispute Disappears, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2010, at A15.  Shortly thereafter, person or persons 
unknown (probably different ones) installed another cross.  Determining that was merely a 
replica, the Park Service took it down.  Lawsuits continue, a $125,000 reward to locate the 
cross stands uncollected as of this date, and a local newspaper received an e-mail claiming 
that the cross had been removed “lovingly,” because the Supreme Court decision had 
“desecrated” it.  Robert Barnes, If There’s No Cross, Is There Still a Case?, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 23, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16799789. 
 222 See discussion of Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d at 1014, supra note 214. 
 223 See infra Part II.A. 
 224 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990). 
 225 Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974) (“[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have 
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound 
when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.”). 
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The Supreme Court cannot continue to speak out of both sides of its 
mouth if it intends to provide real guidance to federal courts on this issue.  
That is, it cannot continue to hold expressly that the injury in fact 
requirement is no different for Establishment Clause cases, while it 
implicitly assumes standing in cases where the alleged injury, in a non-
Establishment Clause case, would not get the plaintiff into the 
courthouse.226 
The suggestion ultimately voiced by Judge DeMoss, that a fair reading of the 
standing doctrine would bar courts from hearing complaints regarding government 
religious speech or displays, is logical.  It is also consistent with other standing 
doctrine.  If the requirement of actual injury is truly settled and truly constitutional in 
nature, and if “psychic injury”227 is insufficient to qualify as a case or controversy, 
the Supreme Court’s view of the merits of the questions such as the display of a 
crèche matter only as an academic exercise.  Indeed, following Hein to its logical 
conclusion and eliminating the anomaly of Flast seems the approach most likely to 
bring consistency to this messy area.228 
IV.  “NEITHER UNDER THE COLOUR OF RIGHT, NOR BY THE WAY OF DEED”:229 THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING STANDING 
If it would bring consistency, however, this approach would also come at what 
might be a terrible price.  For one lesson of American political history old and new 
stands out: if no one has standing to enforce a particular constitutional requirement 
in the courts, that requirement will cease to exist as more than words on paper.   
A.  An Officer and a Legislator 
One startling example of this phenomenon appeared in the summer of 1974.230  
Military reserve personnel and veterans formed an organization to oppose the war in 
Vietnam.231  Possibly because they thought they could actually get some pro-war 
Congressmen removed from the military reserves, or possibly just to make trouble 
for them,232 the Reservists’ Committee to Stop the War sued the Secretary of 
                                                           
 226 Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2007) (DeMoss, J., 
specially concurring). 
 227 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment), which defines psychic injury as “the taxpayer’s mental displeasure 
that money extracted from him is being spent in an unlawful manner” (emphasis in original).  
Of course, the injury of such mental displeasure is even more attenuated when the taxpayer’s 
money has not been spent because the monument was donated, as in Van Orden. 
 228 Id. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that retaining Flast as a 
precedent merely continues “the disreputable disarray of our Establishment Clause standing 
jurisprudence.”). 
 229 WESTPHALIA, supra note 1, at art. II. 
 230 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
 231 Id. at 211. 
 232 There is a hint in the District Court opinion that part of the goal was exposure of 
possible conflicts of interest through “extensive discovery into Pentagon files.”  Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971) [hereinafter Laird]. 
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Defense.  They sought to force him to dismiss the military reserve officers who were 
then members of Congress.233 
The constitutional provision at issue seems quite clear,234 and the Framer’s 
reasons for it stemmed from the tradition of separation of powers and the concern 
over the corruptibility of legislators.235  The District Court found that service as an 
officer in the military reserves violated the Constitution, and issued a declaratory 
judgment to that effect.236 
After affirmation by the Appellate Court, however, the Supreme Court rejected 
the case out of hand.  It was not that the Court found the District Court’s 
understanding of the Constitution or the statute governing the Reserves 
unpersuasive;237 it simply never considered it at all.  The plaintiffs had no standing, 
said the Supreme Court, because of the “necessarily abstract nature of the injury.”238  
The District Court had opined that the Committee had standing as citizens to 
challenge the behavior, in part because the case involved a “precise, self-operative 
provision of the Constitution.”239  It also mattered to the judge that “if these plaintiffs 
cannot obtain judicial review of defendants’ action, then as a practical matter no one 
can.”240 
These factors failed to move the Supreme Court.  Chief Justice Burger 
categorized the arguable constitutional violation as “one which presents injury in the 
abstract,” that would “adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in 
constitutional governance.”241  To the notion that exclusion of these plaintiffs meant 
that no one could ever challenge the alleged violation of the Constitution, the Court 
                                                           
 233 Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 211. 
 234 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, “no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a 
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”  This portion of the Constitution 
is often referred to as the Incompatibility Clause, see Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 210. 
 235 An early version of the clause had members of Congress ineligible to serve as officers 
for one year after leaving Congress; one possible reason for the removal of that bar was the 
concern expressed by James Wilson that such a rule might prevent the nation from using the 
services of the best military commanders during a time of crisis.  See Laird, 323 F. Supp. at 
835-37. 
 236 Id. at 842.  The district court declined to issue the requested injunction ordering the 
elimination of the legislators from the Reserves, finding that there was no “urgent necessity” 
for such action.  Id. at 843. 
 237 The Court certainly might have done so: although the Secretary of Defense’s argument 
focused on standing, an amicus brief of The Reserve Officers Association articulated a 
statutory analysis of the military reserves arguing that such positions were not officers of the 
United States for constitutional purposes.  Brief of the Reserve Officers Ass’n of the U.S. as 
Amicus Curiae on the Merits, Richardson v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,  (No. 72-
1188), 1973 WL 172290. 
 238 Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 220. 
 239 Laird, 323 F. Supp. at 840. 
 240 Id. at 841.  The district judge rejected the other grounds for standing offered by the 
plaintiffs: their status as reservists, as opponents of the Vietnam War, and as taxpayers.  Id. at 
840. 
 241 Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 217. 
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noted merely that “[o]ur system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the 
political process.”242  To this date, members of Congress continue to hold 
commissions as officers in the United States military reserves.  The practice goes 
unchallenged because virtually no one can challenge it.243 
B.  Appointments and Emoluments 
The Constitution also prohibits the appointment of any member of Congress 
“during the Time for which he was elected” to any office of the United States “which 
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased 
during such time.”244 
The language of the clause is direct,245 and its purpose transparent.  The Framers 
were concerned that the president could use his power of appointment “to corrupt or 
seduce a majority” of the legislators.246  Yet on several occasions in the last hundred 
years, Presidents have reached out to sitting members of Congress to appoint them to 
cabinet positions for which the pay has been increased.  The most recent case, the 
appointment of Senator Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State,247 was resolved in the 
same way as the last few: the Saxbe fix.248  The maneuver, named after William 
                                                           
 242 Id. at 227.     
 243 In extraordinarily rare circumstances, a plaintiff making an Incompatibility Clause 
challenge might actually have standing.  Such a case involved Airman First Class Charles 
Lane, who pled guilty to cocaine use in a Special Court-Martial.  Such convictions are initially 
reviewed by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, a panel of uniformed military officers 
required to review cases de novo for legal and factual sufficiency.  One member of Airman 
Lane’s panel was Lt. Col. Lindsey Graham, who was simultaneously a Senator from South 
Carolina.  Airman Lane unsuccessfully challenged Sen. Graham’s assignment to the panel.  In 
his appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.), the civilian court which 
hears appeals from the military Courts of Criminal Appeals, Airman Lane won a new review 
of his conviction and sentence.  The C.A.A.F. held that his personal injury gave him standing, 
and agreed that service as a member of a Court of Criminal Appeals violated the principle of 
separation of powers written into the Incompatibility Clause.  See U.S. v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1 
(2006).  In rejecting the government’s argument that Lane had no standing, the court noted 
that “[u]nder such a regime, the structural integrity of the Constitution would rest on a gravely 
weakened foundation.”  Id. at 4.  Note that this precisely contradicts the U.S. v. Richardson, 
418 U.S. 166 (1974) observation, see supra note 147. 
 244 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.  Alternatively called the Emoluments Clause or, perhaps to 
distinguish it from the other emoluments reference in art. I, § 9, the Ineligibility Clause. 
 245 Or, more precisely, was in 1787.  My colleague Richard A. Bales observes that most of 
us no longer use the term “emoluments” to mean “advantage, profit, or gain received as a 
result of one’s employment or one’s holding of office.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 563 (8th 
ed. 2004).  
 246 THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 247 Because Senator Clinton had been in the Senate when the pay of the Secretary of State 
had been increased, Congress passed a Joint Resolution reducing the pay for that position to 
its earlier level, see Compensation and Other Emoluments Attached to the Office of Secretary 
of State, S.J. Res. 46, 110th Cong. § 1(a), Pub. L. No. 110-455, 122 Stat. 5036 (2008). 
 248 Oddly, the first beneficiary of the “Saxbe fix” was not Saxbe, but Philander Knox sixty-
four years earlier.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentson Unconstitutional, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 907, 909 (1994). 
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Saxbe, nominated to be Attorney General by President Richard Nixon following the 
“Saturday Night Massacre,”249 requires Congress to pass a temporary reduction in 
the pay of the particular office.250  Scholars disagree whether the Saxbe fix actually 
fixes anything.251  The disputes are literally of only academic interest, however, as no 
one appears to have standing to complain.252 
C.  One Nation Under God, by Act of Congress? 
The lesson found in these cases is that Constitutional provisions for which no one 
has standing to sue might as well simply not exist.  The Framers’ elaborate plans to 
protect the separation of powers by preventing either the appointment of legislators 
to executive branch office they had created (or whose emoluments they had 
“encreased”) are widely ignored.  The same is true for the Framers’ careful plan to 
prevent the service of officers as legislators are widely ignored.  The only limit is an 
electoral one: provided a Senator does not offend his or her constituency by service 
in the military reserve, reelection will be possible.  Provided a president does not 
shock the body politic by appointment of members of Congress to executive 
positions, few will care. 
This may be an interesting problem of the sort that troubles constitutional 
scholars253 but ultimately does not imperil the republic.254  The result of such an 
                                                           
 249 The colorful phrase refers to the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, 
which caused a major personnel shake-up when both the Attorney General Elliot Richardson 
and the Deputy Attorney General William Ruckleshaus resigned rather than following 
President Nixon’s order to dismiss the Special Prosecutor.  See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 23-25 (1987). 
 250 Id.  
 251 A decade and a half ago, Prof. Paulsen argued that both plain language and prior 
practice indicated that the rule of the Emoluments is a rule, not a suggestion.  Paulsen, supra 
note 248, at 911 (“It is not sufficient to satisfy the perceived ‘spirit’ of a constitutional 
provision.  The letter of the law must be observed as well.”).  More recently, Prof. Mark 
Tushnet has agreed that “[t]he Saxbe fix seems simply fraudulent.”  Mark Tushnet, 
Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009). 
 252 Paulsen, supra note 248, at 916.  Prof. Paulsen noted that what he called the “Lloyd 
Bentsen Relief from the Constitution Act of 1993” granted standing to anyone “aggrieved by 
an action of the Secretary of the Treasury.”  Id.  Note, though, that the same authorization to 
sue was contained in the law allowing Senator Clinton to become Secretary of State, supra 
note 247, but that in the only case in which a plaintiff raised this challenge, the District Court 
dismissed the suit for the familiar reason that the plaintiff, a State Department employee, 
lacked standing.  See  Rodearmel v. Clinton, 666 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009).  
 253 Prof. Paulsen seemed saddened over the lack of concern about the Saxbe fix in the 
appointment of Senator Bentson to be Secretary of the Treasury.  Paulsen, supra note 248, at 
918 (“The Constitution, apparently, is not a very important political consideration, which 
doesn’t say much for our political stewardship of it.”). 
 254 Prof. Tushnet refers to maneuvers like the Saxbe fix as a “constitutional workaround,” 
albeit a “fraudulent” one, that works because the political branches recognize that they must 
do something rather than simply ignoring the constitutional language, which itself 
“demonstrates a kind of fidelity to the Constitution,” Tushnet, supra note 251, at 1514. 
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approach in the area of the Establishment Clause, however, is far more ominous.255  
If no one were ever able to seek injunctions against government religious speech, it 
seems likely that expressions of endorsement of particular religions would increase, 
perhaps substantially. 
Defenders of restrictive standing rules may argue that this is not a problem.  The 
people, such critics might say, are the ultimate guardians of their own freedom.  
There is no harm in turning these fundamental problems over to the people for their 
ultimate solution.256  After all, if the President was to be given a title, for example 
being named the “Royal Protector” of a foreign land, and the people objected, 
Congress would have a real incentive to impeach.257  If the people did not mind, that 
would answer the question whether the people wished to see that provision enforced, 
preferring instead to allow the President to ignore the plain language of the 
Constitution.258 
Such an approach does seem to call into question the desirability of having a 
written Constitution at all.  Even if one does not find such a political solution 
troubling for some parts of the Constitution,259 there is something that feels very 
disturbing about it when applied to the Establishment Clause.260  For religion carries 
                                                           
 255 In evaluating the Flast-Hein line of cases, even before the issuance of the decision in 
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization, Prof. Manian noted that “[w]ithout such an 
exception to the restriction on taxpayer standing, the right guaranteed by the Establishment 
Clause would essentially have no remedy in many cases.”  Maya Manian, Rights, Remedies, 
and Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 611, 624 (2009). 
 256 Indeed, Justice Scalia seems to have advocated this specifically (“[I]n the context of 
public acknowledgments of God there are legitimate competing interests: On the one hand, the 
interest of that minority in not feeling ‘excluded’; but on the other, the interest of the 
overwhelming majority of religious believers in being able to give God thanks and 
supplication as a people, and with respect to our national endeavors.  Our national tradition 
has resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.”).  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 
900 (2005). 
 257 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9. 
 258 As Prof. Murphy has noted, the end result of some views of standing doctrine is to 
guarantee precisely this result.  Murphy, supra note 123, at 974 (“Justice Scalia has followed 
the logic of this competency argument so far as to argue that restrictive standing doctrine 
improves government performance by protecting the Executive’s power to ignore the law 
from officious judicial efforts to enforce it.”). 
 259 Many commentators find any such line-drawing with regard to the Constitution—as 
opposed to standing in statutory relief cases—troubling.  As Judge Berzon has written, the 
Court in the mid-twentieth century seemed to believe “that the availability of some means of 
enforcement is implicit in the concept of a ‘right,’ and, more broadly, perhaps implicit in the 
nature of a constitution.”  Hon. Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative 
Constitutional Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 685 (2009). 
 260 It may be this instinct that caused Professor Tushnet to declare that “working around the 
thin Constitution’s provisions might be worrisome in a way that working around the thick 
Constitution’s provisions is not.”  Tushnet, supra note 251, at 1507 (defining the “thick 
Constitution” as the organizational part of the document, and the “thin Constitution” as those 
provisions that “directly reflect . . . deep commitments”).  See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 
134, at 167 (arguing that judicial deference seen in areas such as war powers would be 
inappropriate to Establishment Clause questions “because minority interests are frequently at 
stake”). 
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with it a sense of identity, and a political solution, as noted in Carolene Products’ 
celebrated fourth footnote,261 only works against minority positions and minority 
identities.  An enlightened majority may limit its own behavior to protect others,262 
but there is no political incentive for that enlightenment.  Generally, majorities will 
be unenlightened; they will act in their own self-interest, not from a desire to be evil, 
but because they do not even realize they are doing it.263 
There is no real reason to think that provisions of the Constitution that limit 
majority governance are equally well served by judicial enforcement and popular 
political choice.264  If the Bill of Rights is to be enforced only through political 
choices, there was no reason to enfold it into our constitutional structure.265  This is 
no mere hypothetical point.  The history of American law—a law developed by a 
people whose majority has always been Christian in self-identification—has been 
one of quiet, unassuming favoritism for Christianity.  Setting to one side those who 
have actively sought to use the machinery of the state for religious purposes,266 the 
masses of well-meaning Christians have simply reflexively written laws that closed 
stores and entertainment on the Christian day of worship,267and commemorated the 
celebration of the Christian savior’s birth as a national holiday.268  In none of these 
acts was there a deliberate desire to harm members of minority faiths; indeed, many 
who support these actions based on Christianity are astonished by the argument that 
                                                           
 261 In outlining areas which might be subject to more searching judicial scrutiny, Justice 
Stone included the possibility that religious minorities, like racial minorities, might be subject 
to prejudice that would “curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon” to remove “undesirable legislation.”  U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 153 n. 4 (1938). 
 262 In rejecting a constitutionally-compelled exemption from general prohibitions on the 
use of peyote for religious reasons, the Court noted approvingly that it was “not surprising that 
a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use.”  
Employ. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 263 Dissenting from the Court’s rejection of an Air Force regulation that forbade the 
wearing of a yarmulke indoors, Justice Brennan observed that the practical effect of a no 
“visible dress and grooming” requirement, was to establish that “under the guise of neutrality 
and evenhandedness, majority religions are favored over distinctive minority faiths.”  
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 521 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 264 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 134, at 153 (“Many religion-promoting acts by 
government create no obvious material or personal injury and may be quite popular.  The 
political branches thus will frequently have incentives to violate the Clause.”). 
 265 Even a defender of restrictive standing as a means of protecting self-government has 
noted that “[i]f a religious majority were to establish religion at the expense of religious 
minorities through legislative action, there is little prospect of a sufficient ‘political’ remedy 
for a disadvantaged religious (or even secular) minority.”  Jonathon H. Adler, God, Gaia, the 
Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing, Justiciability, and Separation of Powers After 
Massachusetts and Hein, 20 REGENT U.L. REV. 175, 196 (2008). 
 266 See Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892), supra note 111. 
 267 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), supra note 115. 
 268 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012). 
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are acting in a religiously discriminatory way.269  Instead, the majority simply fell 
victim to the predictable assumptions that arise within every culture.  It is difficult to 
recognize that one’s own local experiences do not define the field of human 
existence.  If I am a Christian, surrounded by other Christians, I can easily, though 
mistakenly, conclude that everyone celebrates Christmas, or that the cross is a 
universal symbol of resting places for the dead.  This is especially pronounced in an 
area of human identity as sensitive as religion: members of minority faiths 
sometimes take measures to avoid calling attention to that fact, so members of the 
majority faith may not even realize that there are worshippers of other religions in 
their midst. 
But if there is no political incentive for the majority to regulate itself, and if the 
minority cannot seek the aid of Courts to rectify the situation, then an America open 
to religious pluralism is open only as a matter of legislative, and hence popular, 
grace.  If recent developments in the area of government religious speech have 
shown any consistent trend, it is that this grace is noticeably diminishing in our time.  
An obvious example has been the treatment by the Supreme Court of the Ten 
Commandments, and the subsequent behavior of the American polity.   
Since the Court held that the display of the outdoor stone monument to the 
commandments was permitted, other cities and towns have seized upon this example 
to erect their own monuments to this particular religious code.270  Since the Court 
struck the indoor display in a courthouse using the Lemon271 formulation because of 
the purpose evinced by the County, other cities and counties have had identical 
indoor displays approved because they were approved in silence or with solemn 
intonations of a secular purpose.272 
This is all happening in a legal regime that permits the awkward and 
contradictory standing rules to live, albeit in a weak and sickly form.  One need not 
be too cynical about human nature to fear the sort of things that might happen if the 
                                                           
 269 During the oral argument in Salazar v. Buono, Justice Scalia asked a question 
containing a presumption: “the cross is the -- is the most common symbol of -- of -- of the 
resting place of the dead, and it doesn’t seem to me -- what would you have them erect?  A 
cross -- some conglomerate of a cross, a Star of David, and you know, a Moslem half moon 
and star?”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) 
(No. 08-427).  When counsel for the petitioner responded that “[t]he cross is the most 
common symbol of the resting place of Christians.  I have been in Jewish cemeteries.  There is 
never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew,” Justice Scalia responded that the conclusion that the 
cross in question only honored Christians was “outrageous.” Id. at 39, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-472.pdf. 
 270 Albeit not always successfully, see, e.g., Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 
F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding unconstitutional endorsement in the erection of the 
monument because of religious motivation).  Ultimately the monument was relocated to an 
American Legion building about a block away, see Althea Peterson, Settlement Set in Stone, 
TULSA WORLD, July 28, 2010, at A13. 
 271 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
 272 See, e.g., ACLU v. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 2010).  The original display 
apparently went back up in McCreary County as well, albeit in a less conspicuous location.  
PETER IRONS, GOD ON TRIAL: DISPATCHES FROM AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS BATTLEFIELDS 214 
(2007) (quoting the county judge-executive as saying that “the people here want the 
Commandments in the courthouse”). 
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standing rules were made more consistent and logical.  If only Wallet Injury were 
sufficient to allow citizens to complain of government conduct, much government 
conduct favoring majority religious practice would go unchecked.273  It is not 
impossible to imagine the further ebbing of the populist grace that has marked public 
religion in America.  It is not impossible to imagine a popular Christianity moving 
triumphantly to take possession of the public square. 
V.  “[A]PERPETUAL OBLIVION, AMNESTY, OR PARDON”:274 THE SOLUTION STANDING 
REFORM MIGHT OFFER TO SUBSTANCE 
Fortunately, America’s much-hyped “religious wars” are truly minor by 
comparison with other struggles in human history,275 a mere “kerfuffle” in the words 
of one federal judge.276  Just under four hundred years ago, European principalities 
brought to an end a war that had been “an unprecedented catastrophe for the German 
people.”277  Although The Thirty Year’s War had large political motivations,278 much 
of the ferocity of the war came from the religious identity taken on by many of the 
participants.279  The war was never as simple as Catholic versus Protestant, but the 
slaughters conducted by groups of soldiers fighting under religious banners gave the 
war much of its particular fury.280  When the time finally came that the flames of 
religious and political fervor burned lower,281 the diplomats who settled down in 
Westphalia to conclude a peace treaty opted for the only solution they could find to 
stop fighting.282  They stopped fighting. 
                                                           
 273 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.175 (2011) (permitting local school districts to 
“authorize the recitation of the traditional Lord’s prayer and the pledge of allegiance to the 
flag in public elementary schools”). 
 274 Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. II. 
 275 Indeed, some commentators argue that they are over-hyped, and that religious conflict is 
not truly a matter for worry in the United States.  See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religion, 
Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L. J. 1667, 1720 (2006) (arguing that divisions 
based on religion are not a sound basis for a finding of unconstitutionality because they are no 
more dangerous than political opinions that run along “racial or gender fault lines”).  See also 
Koppelman, supra note 98, at 1838  (“It is not clear why division along religious lines is 
worse than divisions along lines of race, gender, age, ethnicity, or economic class.”). 
 276 Green v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1274 (E.D. Okla. 2006). 
 277 GEOFFREY PARKER, THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 215 (1984). 
 278 CHARLES WILSON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 1558-1648, at 257-58 (1976) 
(describing Catholic France’s entry into the war on the side of the Protestant forces, making it 
essentially a Bourbon versus Hapsburg conflict). 
 279 RICHARD S. DUNN, THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS 1559-1715, at 86 (2d ed. 1979) (noting 
Wallenstein’s forcible conversion of cities he took). 
 280 PARKER, supra note 277, at 125 (describing the “annihilation” of Magdeburg). 
 281 WILSON, supra note 278, at 262 (characterizing Europe as “bankrupt, exhausted, and 
deadlocked” leading to the peace treaty). 
 282 Scholars have noted the wisdom of Westphalia before, but primarily to focus on the 
spatial rather than the temporal nature of the Treaty.  The settlement allowed princes and 
rulers to determine the religion of areas under their control.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Race, 
Religion, Gender, and Interstate Federalism: Some Notes from History, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. 
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A.  Cease and Desist as Solution 
The seeming tautology is actually an observation of some value.283  The great 
discovery of the diplomats gathered at Westphalia was that the wounds of the 
religious conflicts both before and during The Thirty Year’s War ran extraordinarily 
deep.  To allow each side to bring up, and demand restitution for, old injuries would 
doom the process.  The very reparations and apologies would lead to further 
demands, the consideration of more old grievances, and the breakdown of the peace 
talks that all needed because of old injuries that all remembered. 
So the diplomats hit upon the solution of simply starting with a clean slate.  The 
declaration of a “Universal Peace” and “perpetual, true, and sincere Amity”284 was 
followed by the requirement that both sides would grant to the other “a perpetual 
Oblivion, Amnesty, or Pardon of all that has been committed.”285  In other words, the 
parties agreed to forgive, or forget, or both.  In any event, the rule that would cover 
all subsequent time was a rule of peace.  The princes and their civil and military 
lieutenants would “abstain for the future from all Acts of Hostility.”286  There was 
also a guarantee of “the free Exercise of their Religion,”287 although this applied only 
to designated Lutherans in Catholic lands.  Although by no means a universal 
declaration of acceptance for all forms of religion and non-religion alike, the Treaty 
did guarantee those affected the right to practice their faith both in “in public[] 
Churches” and “in private in their own Houses.”288 
Wars in Europe, of course, did not end at Westphalia.  Religious struggles in 
Europe did not even end at Westphalia, but “religion no longer dominated 
international relations as it once had done.”289  The Treaty offered a real start in 
creating a vision for religious pluralism and tolerance, even though it was limited at 
the time to particular sects of the Christian faithful. 
B.  Standing as a Means of Ceasefire 
Is such a solution possible for America’s current struggle over government 
religious speech in the public square?  A revision of standing doctrine might offer 
just such an answer.  It could accomplish a result procedurally that one justice has 
articulated substantively, in a powerful and thoughtful opinion that unfortunately 
failed to garner the support of any of his colleagues. 
                                                           
REV. 19, 23 (1996) (arguing that the Establishment Clause “was the American equivalent of 
the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, or the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, where religious warfare 
in Europe was resolved by allowing the religion of the local prince to determine the religion of 
the principality.”).   
 283 Such declarations are not unknown at the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Parents Involved in 
Comm. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”). 
 284 Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. I. 
 285 Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. II. 
 286 Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. CIV. 
 287 Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. XXVIII. 
 288 Id. 
 289 PARKER, supra note 277, at 218. 
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The opinion that hoped for an end to religious strife came from the pen of Justice 
Breyer in Van Orden v. Perry.290  His separate opinion in that case carried with it the 
fifth vote that allowed the Fraternal Order of Eagles’ Ten Commandments 
monument to remain outside the Texas state capitol in Austin.291  Eschewing the 
plurality’s analysis, and specifically rejecting Justice Scalia’s announcement of a 
“monotheism exception” to the Establishment Clause,292 Justice Breyer focused on a 
variety of factors.  Although he referred to the monument’s setting among other 
(unequivocally secular) monuments,293 foremost on his mind seems to have been the 
prevention of further religious struggle.  He noted that “40 years passed in which the 
presence of this monument, legally speaking, went unchallenged.”294  Observing that 
nothing suggested that intimidation caused this period of peace, he concluded that 
“the public visiting the capitol grounds has considered the religious aspect of the 
tablets’ message as part of what is a broader moral and historical message reflective 
of a cultural heritage.”295 
Justice Breyer found that under Lemon as well as Justice O’Connor’s 
observations about endorsement, with which he specifically agreed, the monument 
passed constitutional muster.296  Perhaps more importantly, he expressed his concern 
that  
[t]o reach a contrary conclusion here, based primarily on the religious 
nature of the tablets’ text would, I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility 
toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions.  
Such a holding might well encourage disputes concerning the removal of 
longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings 
across the Nation.  And it could thereby create the very kind of religiously 
based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.297 
His opinion announced that the primary distinctions between the Texas 
Commandments, which he voted to allow, and the Kentucky Commandments, which 
he voted to take down, were the purpose of the display and its effect on observers.298  
Yet he also characterized as the “determinative” factor the age of the Texas 
monument.299  One admittedly simplistic way to read the distinction between the two 
was to view old monuments as permissible, but not new ones. 
                                                           
 290 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005). 
 291 See id. 
 292 Id. at 704 n. 17. 
 293 Id. at 702. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 703. 
 296 Id. at 704. 
 297 Id. (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)). 
 298 Id. at 703. 
 299 Id. at 702. 
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As a substantive matter this position is hard to defend.300  Some commentators 
noted sharply that it takes an extraordinarily well-versed observer to note the 
differences between an old monument and a new one.301  Indeed, other Ten 
Commandments monuments have appeared in other places since Van Orden.  While 
most lack some of the stylistic devices of the group prepared by the Fraternal Order 
of Eagles four decades ago—some even containing misspellings302—it would be 
unsurprising if new arrivals in the town thought such monuments dated back to an 
earlier day.  A legal brief filed with the Court can say when the monument was 
erected; unless there is a date on the monument itself, an observer likely will not 
know. 
If the old/new dichotomy makes little sense as a substantive test, though, it serves 
magnificently to alleviate the procedural problem.  If the Court were to recast 
standing, which seems necessary in any event, that doctrine could serve the same 
purpose as Justice Breyer’s test. 
To create a Westphalian solution, the Court could say: one has standing to raise 
an Establishment Clause challenge about a future or current act of government 
religious speech, but not a past one.  The injury, the Court might say, occurs when 
the religious speech occurs, when the monument is erected or installed.  Such 
monuments do not continue to speak, the Court could hold, thus protecting older 
monuments from the application of Lemon, which they might well fail.  More 
importantly, such a doctrine would free the Court from the current agony of simply 
ignoring Lemon and substituting some other test in cases of long-ago government 
speech in which a majority of the Supreme Court does not like the result that a fair 
application of Lemon would bring.303 
                                                           
 300 As Justice Scalia has noted, “the antiquity of the practice at issue . . . is hardly a good 
reason for letting an unconstitutional practice continue.”  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 
844, 892 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Others have pointed out that Justice Breyer’s 
emphasis on divisiveness inherently works against minority faiths.  See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, 
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 263 
(2008) (“Should we really say that a display that everyone likes and that isn’t stirring up 
trouble, because the offended minorities are too powerless to make trouble, is for that reason 
constitutional?”).  It is notable, though, that Professor Nussbaum seems to adopt a similar 
old/new test when resolving the case herself.  See id. at 265 (“[T]he monument has stood there 
for forty-five years without controversy, so it can fairly be claimed that it has become a part of 
Texas tradition.  Surely removing a monument in such circumstances is a far more aggressive 
judicial act than simply telling Kentucky it cannot proceed with its new program.”). 
 301 See, e.g., Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable 
Observer Framework in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and 
Van Orden v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 139 (2006). 
 302 See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1277 (E.D. Okla. 
2006) (the monument at issue condemned something called “adultry”). 
 303 Or, as one justice has argued, fears the logical result of the test: 
What, then, could be the genuine “good reason” for occasionally ignoring the 
neutrality principle?  I suggest it is the instinct for self-preservation, and the 
recognition that the Court, which “has no influence over either the sword or the 
purse,” cannot go too far down the road of an enforced neutrality that contradicts both 
historical fact and current practice without losing all that sustains it: the willingness of 
the people to accept its interpretation of the Constitution as definitive, in preference to 
the contrary interpretation of the democratically elected branches. 
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VI.  WESTPHALIAN AMERICA 
There would still be litigation under such an approach, but it would offer more 
clarity than what is currently available.  An analysis of the expected outcomes of a 
few possible cases will illustrate what such a regime might look like. 
Consider first our example earlier of a proposed giant cross on the national 
mall.304  As a new monument, the cross is a change to the status quo.  Because it is a 
change, anyone who personally disapproved would have standing to challenge the 
installation.  There would be no need to navigate the contortions of finding an injury, 
no requirement that any person show that he or she had to use the mall for some 
reason, but was deprived of access by the oppressive effects of the cross.  The fact of 
newness, the very creation of the monument, would suffice to allow a federal court 
to entertain the case.  The court could then proceed to the substantive test for 
Establishment Clause violation.  In this case, Lemon would seem to suffice.  It is 
difficult to find a purpose other than a religious one in the creation of a giant, 
sectarian monument.  Additionally, it is implausible that such a monument would not 
advance Christianity.  Indeed, it is possible that the selection of the style of cross 
itself, from options as diverse as the Greek, Latin, or Russian crosses, could be 
evidence of excessive entanglement. 
On the other hand, assume a challenge to the portrait of Moses carrying the Ten 
Commandments on the frieze inside the Supreme Court.305  Under the current model 
of thinking, a court would first have to be convinced that some person suffered some 
injury from this particular bit of artwork.  Having so concluded, it would then 
predictably go on to apply a historical exception analysis, or a coercion test, or a 
mere ceremonial deism rubric.  Under a Westphalian analysis, none of this would be 
necessary.  The court could examine the age of the frieze, and dismiss the plaintiff 
for want of standing.   
Events that repeat would prove slightly more difficult, but not much.  Standing 
would still focus on the age of the defendant’s act, rather than any metaphysical state 
of the plaintiff.  The question in repeating cases, though, would center on the 
originality of the act.  One could distinguish here between a mere clerical act that 
does not imply a new decision, and an event that repeats through individual choices 
by government officials.  So, for example, a newly minted coin bears the motto “In 
God We Trust.”  That action by the mint, though, is no more than a routine act306 
repeated more or less consistently since 1864.307  Such a practice, offering no change 
                                                           
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 892-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).  
 304 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 305 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 874. 
 306 This is true even setting aside possible coin redesign, which seems sure always to 
include the motto.  Indeed, the recent issuance of commemorative presidential dollars 
illustrates this.  For design purposes, the phrase was moved to the edge of the coins; an outcry 
caused the mints to move the phrase back onto the reverse.  There was never really a 
possibility that coins would be issued without the motto.  That did not stop an internet rumor 
campaign alleging that the United States was “phasing God out of America.”  See Historic 
Change, SNOPES.COM, http://www.snopes.com/politics/religion/dollarcoin.asp (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2012). 
 307 U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, History of ‘In God We Trust,’ http://www.treasury.gov/ 
about/education/Pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx. (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). 
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from the status quo, would not be subject to challenge.  It does not matter whether 
the putative plaintiff was annoyed, intimidated, or even so paralyzed by opposition 
to the motto that he found himself unable to use the money.  The court should 
dismiss the challenge as a challenge to a long-existing practice. 
This differs from an official prayer at an annual graduation ceremony.  Although 
such a practice might be traced back for years or decades, each year presents a new 
and distinct decision by some official to include the prayer, and a second decision as 
to the prayer’s content.  A member of the community concerned about such a 
practice could bring a challenge, and the court should recognize this as the kind of 
new religious speech that conveys standing.  The court could then proceed to a 
Lemon analysis, augmented, if it wished, by the use of the endorsement or coercion 
tests.  All three should produce the same results: the very factors of audience age and 
independence that would indicate whether the event was coercive would also 
demonstrate its purpose and primary effect.  Just as with stationary monuments, in 
these cases of repeated acts, courts would be spared the unhelpful exercise of 
choosing the test to fit the desired result. 
The toughest cases are those of monuments that are neither brand new nor 
encrusted with the patina of ages.  If one imagines a small town erecting a 
monument to honor God on the courthouse steps, is the passage of five years 
sufficient to exclude standing when a new member of the community does sue?  To 
answer such a puzzle, I would propose that the court look at the same sorts of factors 
that appeared in Justice Breyer’s opinion: the age of the monument, the deliberation 
and publicity that was given to its installation, and the behavior of the public in their 
reaction to it.308 
Consideration of factors like these, in the context of a Westphalian test, would 
direct the court’s focus toward the extent to which the government speech in 
question is truly a thing of the past.  Current standing doctrine requires instead that 
courts play an almost whimsical game of “is the plaintiff prevented from using this 
area?”  If the court finds that the plaintiff is, indeed, barred from the use of a public 
place by an aggressively overhanging religious use, it must apply one of a variety of 
tests, with no real guidance on which test to use.  As a result, courts are often 
allowed to choose the test that will reach the result the judge instinctively prefers.  
This is the worst possible result; not only is the doctrine not clear, it is subject to 
egregious acts of manipulation.    
Thus the ultimate beneficiary of a Westphalian test for standing is thus the clarity 
of the doctrine itself.  The only compelling explanation for the cafeteria-style variety 
of tests is that the courts find that Lemon at times fails to match their judicial 
instincts.  The abundance of other tests lets courts pick and choose and camouflage 
instinctual behavior with the trappings of law.  Allowing Westphalian standing to 
screen out some cases and screen in others would relieve Lemon from that task and 
allow it instead to sort the remaining sheep from the goats. 
VII.  “[A] CHRISTIAN AND UNIVERSAL PEACE?”309 
In a far more gentle and civilized way, we find ourselves in much the same 
position as the Europeans of the mid-seventeenth century.  Groups on alternate sides 
of religious questions in our polity view each other with the disdain once reserved 
                                                           
 308 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702-03 (2005). 
 309 Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. I. 
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for heretics.  Each side believes itself to be put upon, excluded, or oppressed.  It does 
not take an outsider long to discover that each of these communities carries a deep 
sense of victimization by “them”—some other group that actually runs the 
country.310 
Just as did the diplomats of Westphalia, we must call things off and demand 
tolerance for all before things grow worse.  Using current government activity as a 
baseline for standing would ask both sides in the conflict to cease hostilities.  
Advocates of non-religion would be unable to demand the removal of old 
expressions of faith, springing from American experience of long ago.  Advocates of 
religion would be unable to demand new government proclamations of religion.  
Such disputes have not served the nation well, and the best way to end this religious 
war is to end the religious war.  Perhaps the best way to do that is to reorient our 
standing question in Establishment Clause cases from “Was it the legislature or the 
executive that made the decision to spend the money?” or “Is this the kind of psychic 
injury that conveys standing?” to “Is the government speaking religiously now, or is 
this something that happened in the past?” 
The current chaotic jurisprudence tends to apply a restrictive constitutional rule 
when confronting a new act of government religious speech, and a permissive rule 
when looking at an old one.  Although such a system may prevent religious warfare, 
it does so by adopting a series of distinctions that make little sense to onlookers.  
Extreme groups on both sides can also manipulate these tests to advance their own 
lines in the ongoing battles.  The doctrine of the Establishment Clause ends up being 
pulled and torn until it makes little sense even to those who author it. 
A standing rule, in contrast, would allow the Court to reach results likely to 
promote peace in a sensible way.  A time-based rule would make sense to the public.  
Other courts would find it easier to apply than the current grab-bag of available tests.  
Critics might note that this way of resolving problems is artificial and pragmatic.  A 
rule of standing that finds injury only in current government action, though, is no 
more artificial than a rule of standing that denies that there is harm in Psychic Injury, 
but allows some cases to proceed based on Psychic Injury.  A time-based rule is no 
more artificial than a rule that recognizes injury from spending when done by the 
legislature but not the executive.  And pragmatic is not a bad thing to be. 
Such an approach would fail to mollify the extremists on either side, but it might 
calm enough combatants that many would be willing to lay down their metaphorical 
arms before the battles worsen.  For ultimately, our nation must continue to face the 
question that Justice O’Connor asked us just before she left the Supreme Court: 
“Why would we trade a system that has served us so well, for one that has served 
others so poorly?”311 
 
                                                           
 310 For a thoughtful analysis of the problem, and a different possible solution, see Griffin, 
supra note 3, at 25 (“[[T]he constitutional and political]environment now mistakenly favors 
religion instead of religious liberty and fosters wars of religion instead of peaceful 
tolerance.”). 
 311 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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